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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
Three Essays on Residential Real Estate Brokerage 
 
 
 
 
The first essay investigates how individual characteristics influence sales out-
comes for houses they help transact.  It develops hedonic housing models to assess the 
impacts of agent characteristics such as the level of recent and concurrent agent activity 
on sales outcomes (price and time on market).  This is done in a Multiple Listing Service 
(MLS) setting using seven years of data obtained from a large Midwestern city.  I find 
evidence that more active listing agents sell homes more quickly, though they do so to the 
detriment of final sales price.  I also find that more listings concurrently held by agents 
have a statistically significant, negative effect on price.  Selling agents appear to be quite 
neutral in the process and have little effect on either sales price or time on market. 
The second essay defines market concentrations of residential real estate broker-
age services across one hundred diverse U.S. markets.  Since real estate is immobile, each 
geographical location constitutes a local market and thus national measures of market 
concentration, of the type espoused by the National Association of Realtors (NAR), are 
of little value.  The only way to get a meaningful picture of the market in general is to 
collectively examine observations at the city/town level. Once indices of concentration 
are obtained, it may be possible to get a sense of minimum and maximum scale efficien-
cies as well as what market specific characteristics give rise to high or low concentra-
tions. 
The third essay examines the “just-below” pricing strategy in the context of home 
sales.  Many retailers price their goods/services directly below some round amount (i.e. 
pricing at $2.99 instead of $3.00) and a number of studies document the effectiveness of 
this strategy on the demand for relatively inexpensive items (clothing, groceries, small 
appliances, etc).  A lesser developed strand of literature examines the prevalence and ef-
fectiveness of just-below pricing in the context of larger purchases, namely real estate. 
This essay affirms the prevalence of just-below pricing in home transactions and finds 
  
evidence that just-below pricing can yield a higher final transaction price compared to 
homes initially priced on an even price point. 
 
KEYWORDS: Real estate, broker characteristics, agent characteristics, market struc-
ture, pricing strategies 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, nearly five million existing homes were transacted, the large majority of 
them with the assistance of a real estate agent.  Real estate brokerage has thus become a 
large industry which annually generates sixty to seventy billion dollars from home trans-
actions.  Furthermore, seventy percent of Americans own the home they live in and it of-
ten represents the largest component of net wealth.  As such, understanding the residen-
tial real estate brokerage process and market takes on special significance, especially in 
the context of the recent home value adjustments beginning in late 2007. 
 The first essay explores the effects of agent characteristics on residential home 
sales outcomes, specifically final sales price and time on market.  Since selling one‟s 
home usually represents one of the largest transactions in a person‟s life, and since few 
people go through the process more than a few times, it is unsurprising that a market for 
specialized transaction assistance would develop.  Real estate agents fulfill this role, act-
ing as middlemen who use their experience, marketing skills, and institutional knowhow 
to match potential buyers with sellers as well as assist in price negotiation.  While many 
papers have compared unassisted transaction outcomes (“for sale by owner” homes) to 
those brokered by a professional, relatively few have looked into the impact of specific 
agent characteristics in the context of agent assisted transactions.  This first essay ex-
amines the impact on sales outcomes produced by agents that are more active in transact-
ing properties (measured, for example, by the number of transactions the agent has been 
involved in over the past thirty days), as well as the effect of more concurrent listings 
held by the listing agent.  More active listing agents may have a better knowledge of cur-
rent market conditions which could translate into better outcomes for the seller.  On the 
other hand, due to a principle-agent problem between the seller and the listing agent, high 
levels of agent activity may signify eagerness on the part of the agent to “get the deal 
done” and to do so quickly even if it means a reduction in the final sales price, since, on 
the margin, a reduction in sale price represents only a small reduction in agent income.  
Seven years of Multiple Listing Service data from a large Midwestern city are used to 
construct housing hedonics which include these measures of agent activity.  Controlling 
for observable house characteristics, results indicate that agents listing and selling more 
houses are able to complete transactions quicker, but the final sales price tends to be low-
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er. Concurrently held listings have a statistically noticeable, but very small, negative im-
pact on the sales price. 
 The second essay looks at the real estate industry at the firm level. With relatively 
low barriers to entry and the Multiple Listing Service, which grants all participants equal 
listing exposure regardless of size, one may expect this market to be highly competitive.  
The Department of Justice, however, reports anecdotal evidence of high market concen-
trations in some areas and the seemingly rigid six percent commission structures further 
raises questions about the competitiveness of the industry.  While inter-firm collusion 
over commission rates is illegal, brokerage firm owners can and do impose floors on 
commissions their agents can charge.  Inter-firm competition is then important to under-
standing the competitiveness of the industry. Since each city/town is an individual and 
autonomous market, national measures of concentration are of little value and only a few 
studies have measured concentration in specific, individual markets.  Even collectively, 
these studies of individual markets provide a very incomplete picture of the overall struc-
ture.  This essay uses a Multiple Listings Service aggregator website owned by the Na-
tional Association of Realtors (www.realtor.com) to collect information on listings over 
one hundred individual local markets of varying size and geographical location.  The 
website hosts a profile for each active Multiple Listing Service listing in the geographic 
area specified.   These profiles include basic housing characteristics (number of bed-
rooms, bathrooms, etc), the listing price of the home, and, most importantly, the asso-
ciated listing brokerage firm. Measures of market concentration, such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index and concentration ratios, are then constructed.  While a few instances of 
relatively high concentration do exist, overall, concentration levels appear not to be 
alarming, with an average Herfindahl-Hirschman index of around 1,000.  Further analysis 
explores what city/town level factors influence market concentration and finds market 
size does have some effect as small markets tend to be more concentrated.  Since particu-
larly small markets tend to be the most concentrated, this may suggest a non-zero mini-
mum efficient scale, but the large number of very small firms operating across all sized 
markets suggests this assertion must be made with caution. 
 The third essay addresses the prevalence and effectiveness of a “just-below” pric-
ing strategy in residential real estate.  Many retailers choose to strategically price their 
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goods/services just below some round price focal point (i.e. pricing at $2.99 rather than 
$3.00).  Many studies have been done on just- below pricing in the context of inexpen-
sive household goods and they often find it can have a noticeable, sometimes startling, 
effect on demand.  Much less work has been done on the effectiveness of just-below pric-
ing on very large purchases, such as houses.  This is interesting because many of the al-
leged psychological mechanisms by which just-below pricing is thought to work, such as 
consumer‟s misperception of pricing information, may have a much weaker effect for 
large, important purchases which are undoubtedly considered with more scrutiny.  Two 
existing studies that have looked into just-below pricing in housing have reached oppos-
ing conclusions as to its effect.  Drawing again from the data used in the first essay, the 
high frequency with which home sellers (and their real estate agents) use just-below pric-
ing seems to suggest that they expect it to have some beneficial effect.  Indicator va-
riables are created for homes which employ just-below pricing and are included in a 
housing hedonic to show that pricing just below a $10,000 pricing increment is indeed 
associated with a higher final sales price, especially when compared to homes priced 
right on the increment.  Direct comparisons of homes just below and right on an even 
focal price point also suggest a premium for a just-below price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Copyright © Jason S. Beck 2009 
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CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECT OF AGENTS ON RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 
SALES OUTCOMES 
2.1 Introduction 
Real estate agents are middlemen who use their knowledge and ability to facilitate 
exchanges between buyers and sellers of homes.  The frequency with which sellers and 
buyers choose to involve agents suggests that market participants value their services.
1
 
Since homes typically represent a large portion of an individual‟s wealth, understanding 
the transaction process is important.  Recently, it has become clear that the U.S. housing 
market has entered a period of adjustment.  Nationally, home prices have fallen over ele-
ven percent in the one year period ending in September, 2008 while the number of homes 
sold has decreased by a third in the same period.
2
  Some specific areas have been affected 
even more severely.
3
 In light of these recent developments, understanding the role of real 
estate agents in the transaction process takes on extra significance, particularly to those 
hoping to buy or sell a home. 
Several studies have examined the effects of agents by comparing sales outcomes 
between professionally brokered homes versus non-brokered “for sale by owner” (FSBO) 
homes with mixed conclusions.  Relatively little work has focused on the effects of indi-
vidual agents on sales outcomes among brokered homes.  This paper will expand the ex-
isting literature by exploring the effects of agent characteristics on outcomes in a Mul-
tiple Listing Service setting.  Specifically, level of recent agent activity, agent familiarity 
with a particular market segment, and number of concurrent listings held by the listing 
agent will be examined.  The results indicate that more active agents sell homes faster, 
but do so at the detriment of sales price.  There is also evidence that listing agents holding 
a greater number of concurrent listings obtain a lower sales price, though the marginal 
effect is very small. 
                                                 
1
 The National Association of Realtors (NAR) reports that 84% of residential real estate transactions are 
made with the assistance of an agent (www.Realtor.org).  
2
 U.S. Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing.html)  
3
 For instance, some previously robust markets, such as Phoenix and Las Vegas, have seem home prices 
fall over 30% in one year. 
(http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.topic/indices_csmahp/0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,
0,0,0,0.html).  
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2.1.1  What Do Agents Do? 
 The selling of one‟s home is likely to be one of the largest transactions most indi-
viduals engage in.  As such, even small errors in pricing or marketing could cost thou-
sands of dollars in lost sales price or cause the home to remain on the market for an ex-
tended period of time.  Furthermore, most people go through the process only a few times 
in their lifetime and thus the development of a market for brokers with specialized know-
ledge and ability is reasonable.  For home sellers, real estate agents provide knowledge of 
local market conditions, home presentation, and marketing knowhow.  They also help to 
discern an appropriate asking price, and to locate potential buyers.  Traditional full ser-
vice real estate agents provide these services.
4
  Real estate agents/brokers are usually 
compensated for their services through a commission rate calculated on the final sales 
price of the house (Section 2.2 contains a more detailed description of the compensation 
structure of agents/brokers). 
 The distinction between a real estate “agent” and a real estate “broker” should be 
clarified.  A broker refers to an individual with a state issued license to transact real prop-
erty.  Every real estate office must thus have at least one broker.  An agent is an individu-
al typically specializing in dealing with customers but who must work with a broker to 
conduct the transaction on behalf of the client.  Agents must also possess a license from 
the state.  An agent license is a prerequisite to a broker licenses and is easier to obtain.  
Real estate professionals with a broker‟s license often work as agents and thus basically 
are autonomous firms.  It is also common for a single brokerage firm to have several 
(sometime even hundreds) of agents under a single broker.  Since there is probably more 
heterogeneity in agents‟ ability to match buyers with sellers, market a house, obtain 
choice listings, etc. than in brokerage,
5
 agents will be the primary focus of this paper.  
 For a given transaction, there are typically two types of agents: listing agents and 
selling agents.  Listing agents are those contacted by the seller to assist in the selling 
                                                 
4
 Nadel (2006) has classified the services of full service real estate agents into the following eight catego-
ries that have been cited in the literature: 1) MLS listing, 2) Closing, 3)Setting an optimal asking price and 
time to sell, 4) Advertizing beyond the MLS, 5) Staging, 6) Arranging visits by potential buyers, 
7)Negotiations, and 8) Other services, such as advice on which home improvements would affect resale 
value or leasing possibilities for the property. 
5
 Although the actual brokerage may be fairly homogenous, brokers may influence managerial style or ac-
quisition of individual agents which could have an overall impact.  As such, firm level controls should be 
built into any empirical model developed. 
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process.  Selling agents, in spite of the perhaps misleading name, are involved on the 
buy-side of the transaction.  They are typically contacted by an interested buyer seeking 
assistance in finding a house to purchase.  Note that while specialization can and does 
occur, nearly all agents involve themselves with both listing and selling at some point.  
Using their skills and knowledge along with tools of the profession (the MLS, for in-
stance), listing and selling agents assist in bringing the two parties together.  Traditional-
ly, the homeowner pays the listing agent a commission which the listing agent then 
shares in some proportion with the selling agent (and the associated buy-side broker) and 
thus the homeowner is indirectly paying for the selling agent‟s services as well.  It is be-
cause of this that selling agents are said to owe fiduciary responsibilities to the home-
owner, despite the frequent perception that the selling agent represents the buyer
6
.  Some 
states allow for the possibility of so-called “dual agency”, whereby a single agent (and 
thereby a single broker) handles both sides of the transaction.  Evidence is mixed as to 
the effect of dual agency compared to the traditional model (see Evans (2005) and Gar-
diner (2007)). 
 
2.1.2 Over What Dimensions Might Agents Differ? 
 An obvious dimension of differentiation would be specialization among agents 
into listing versus selling.  This has been explored by Zumpano et al. (1993).  Since the 
skills required in listing and selling may differ, it is reasonable to think some specializa-
tion could occur.  Zumpano et al. find that specialization in listing has a statistically sig-
nificant (and positive) impact on agent income. 
The abilities, effort levels, and performances of agents are likely heterogeneous, 
so several studies take a human capital approach to earnings.  They tend to find fairly un-
surprising effects (i.e. more experience is associated with higher earnings) but the effect 
on sales outcomes remains understudied (Section 2.2 contains a brief review of this litera-
ture). 
                                                 
6
 The rise of so-called “buyers agents” is well documented (see Elder et al. (2000), Munneke and Yavas 
(1999)).  These agents alter the traditional model by substituting an agent paid by the buyer with fiduciary 
responsibilities to the buyer in place of a selling agent.  These types of transactions represent a fairly small 
part of the brokerage market and have surprisingly shown little effect in sales prices (see Section 2.2 for a 
more detailed review of the literature). 
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For a listing agent, knowledge of the market and how to present a home to max-
imize its appeal are important abilities, but agents may also differ on dimensions that are 
not directly related to selling homes.  For instance, given the fairly fixed rate commission 
structure, if effort to sell a house is homogenous across homes (or perhaps fairly close), 
higher value homes lead to higher commission fees and thus are more desirable.  It is 
possible that two agents may have identical sales abilities but one is better able to locate 
and get listing contracts from higher priced homes.  One might assume that in equili-
brium, competition for high value homes would be fiercer than for low value ones and 
agents better able to locate high value homes would be able to earn higher incomes.  Na-
turally this depends on agents having different ability in locating high value homes.  If 
agents are all the same one would expect incomes to equalize, with some agents having a 
few high value homes and some agents having a larger number of low value homes. 
Another possibility is that agents differ in their ability to locate and/or win con-
tracts for homes that are appealing in some unobservable way.  Even a very rich set of 
hedonic controls will not account for everything.  One example that comes to mind is 
“curb appeal”.  If agents vary in their ability to recognize and/or list homes with differing 
amount of curb appeal, there could be better sales outcomes associated with certain 
agents that do not come from selling ability. 
 The chapter will proceed as follows.  Section 2.2 outlines the pertinent literature.  
Section 2.3 discusses the data used in the empirical analysis.  Section 2.4 discusses the 
results and Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
2.2.1 Agents as an Input in the Matching Process 
 Brokerage is often modeled as listing agents expending effort to first secure list-
ings and then match with selling agents associated with prospective home buyers.  In an 
early and influential paper, Yinger (1981) discusses the nature of the brokered transaction 
and develops a formal search model where offers come through random draws from the 
population of potential buyers.  Search activities of agents are inputs to their output 
(matching buyers with sellers) and are the main choice variable for agents in the model.  
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Intuitively, search activities increase as search costs decrease or as commission rates in-
crease.  Other search modeling can be seen in Williams (1998), Johnson et al. (1988) and 
Salant (1991). 
  
2.2.2  Agent Compensation 
 Several papers focus on a human capital approach to agent income.  Glower and 
Hendershott (1988) use survey data of 481 Ohio Realtors in 1986 to examine the relation-
ship between income and traditional human capital controls.  Consistent with theory, 
hours worked, education, and experience seem to affect earnings with the experience ef-
fect diminishing and leveling off at around seventeen years.  Follian et al. (1987) follow a 
similar methodology using an Illinois survey with similar results.  Finally, Crellin et al. 
(1988) utilize a nationwide 1984 NAR survey with 1,600 observations and largely con-
firm the Glower and Hendershott and Follian et al. findings.  In all three studies, higher 
incomes were linked to hours worked, possessing a broker‟s license, education, and expe-
rience.  Gender and race seem to have a fairly minor impact on agents‟ earnings but a 
larger one on brokers‟. 
 Under a fixed commission rate structure, all else equal, higher home values in an 
area would mechanically translate into higher agent incomes.  However, low barriers to 
entry imply that any excess returns will be eroded by entry.  Hsieh and Moretti (2003) 
theorize that under fixed commissions, areas with higher average home values will have 
more agents competing for these lucrative listings, resulting in an average agent obtaining 
and selling a fewer number of homes.  They compare two cities, Boston and Minneapolis, 
which are similar over most dimensions except for housing prices, which were roughly 
twice as high in Boston.  Selling a house in Boston then would yield a commission fee 
that is roughly twice as large compared to a similar transaction in Minneapolis.  Interes-
tingly, they find that the average agent in Minneapolis is twice as productive, selling 6.6 
houses per year versus 3.3 for the average agent in Boston.  The implication is that free 
entry is socially wasteful in this case because agents will engage in wasteful prospecting 
actives. 
 Johnson et al. (2007) examine agent income with respect to agent specialization.  
Broadly speaking, agents can choose to specialize in finding sellers and listing homes, or 
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in matching prospective buyers to homes for sale in the market.  The 2001 NAR Mem-
bership Survey was used with a fairly straightforward human capital earnings equation 
with controls for degree of specialization in either listing or selling.  The results indicate 
that a balanced portfolio is associated with lower earnings, but only specialization in list-
ing is associated with statistically significant higher earnings. 
 
2.2.3 Firm Structure 
The NAR reports that in 2004 there were 236,000 active real estate brokerage of-
fices in the United States.  These offices range greatly in size from a single broker (who 
also serves as the office‟s lone agent) to very large firms serving an entire metropolitan 
area with hundreds of agents.  This large disparity in firm size is sometimes attributed to 
the MLS (NAR, 2005) which make listings available through a computerized database 
inviting selling agents to cooperate in a transaction.  In such a platform, smaller firms ad-
vertize listings on even footing with larger ones and exposure is obtained to the widest 
possible audience.  However, Frew (1987) has shown that sharing information can be in-
consistent with income maximization.  It is theorized that since cooperating with another 
firm to sell a listing involves sharing the commission (a fifty percent/fifty percent split is 
typical but not exclusive) there may be incentives to “hold back” listings and try to sell 
them “in house” thereby keeping the entire commission within the firm.  Clearly this is 
more likely to happen with large firms as they will have access to a larger number of in 
house potential buyers, and there is some evidence to support this.  In a follow up paper, 
Frew et al. (1993) examine the offered commission rates (the so-called “co-broke” rates) 
in the Lexington, Kentucky MLS and find that the commission offered to the cooperating 
broker is negatively related to the size of the listing firm. 
 There is some evidence of economies of scale and scope in brokerage.  Zumpano 
et al. (1993) employ a translog cost function and NAR survey data of brokerage firms to 
examine the performance of the market.  Their findings suggest that there are modest 
scale economies in brokerage, yet most firms are too small to fully take advantage of 
them.  Zumpano and Elder (1994) look at the two primary dimensions of specialization, 
listing and selling, and find that the compositions of output can affect costs and that a ba-
lanced composition of sales and listings is least costly. 
10 
 
 A few papers look into franchise affiliation and its effect on firm performance.  
Franchise affiliation generally offers a well-known brand and may signal quality.  This 
may be particularly pronounced in real estate brokerage since a subset of home buyers are 
new to a city and would likely have little specialized knowledge of local firms.  This may 
lead to increased reliance on firms affiliated with a franchise.  Most work seems to either 
support or at least not contradict a positive association between franchise affiliation and 
earnings (see Frew and Jud (1986), Lewis and Anderson (1999), and Jud et al. (1994)).  
Benjamin et al. use a 2001 national NAR survey of brokerage firms and find that fran-
chise affiliation is associated with higher revenues, but not profits, indicating that fran-
chisors are able to extract rents from franchisees. 
 
2.2.4  Effects of Agents on Sales Outcomes 
i.)  Performance of agents versus self-marketed homes (FSBO‟s) 
Several studies have compared sales outcomes of homes sold through agents ver-
sus those sold through a seller‟s own efforts (known as For-Sale-By-Owner, or FSBO 
transactions).  Intuitively, one would expect an agent to have some beneficial impact on 
price (if not necessarily the price net of the commission fee) and/or time on market but a 
few studies have called this into question and it is probably fair to say that no clear con-
sensus has emerged in the literature.  One noteworthy paper by Hendel et al. (2007) has 
made use of data from a well developed FSBO website (FSBOMadison.com) in the Mad-
ison, Wisconsin area and was able to compare those transactions with those sold through 
the area‟s conventional MLS.  Results indicate that homes listed with agents are generally 
not associated with a higher sales price though time on market is generally shorter.  The 
authors point out that even if there is a not an associated increase in sales price, agents do 
provide benefit to the seller in the form of assistance through the process which likely has 
value.  As such, it is not necessarily possible to conclude that agents are not worth the 
commission.  Other studies that find FSBO outcomes comparable or superior to those 
listed on the MLS include papers by Yavas and Colwell (1995) and Johnson et al. (2005).  
Dorian et al. (1985), Jud and Frew (1986), and Colwell et al. (1992) find that agents do 
obtain a higher sales price compared to FSBO‟s. 
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 ii.) Relative performance of agents in agent assisted transactions 
 Since the main focus of this essay will be examining the heterogeneous effects of 
individual agents, the studies reviewed in this section are most pertinent.  Specifically, 
the papers by Jud and Winkler (1994) and Turnbull and Dombrow (2007) call for particu-
lar attention. 
 In their 1994 paper “What Do Real Estate Brokers Do: An Examination of Excess 
Returns in the Housing Market”, Jud and Winkler explore brokerage firm and agent cha-
racteristics on the prices received by home sellers.  They use around 4000 MLS transac-
tions (1991-1993) from Greensboro, North Carolina to first construct a traditional hedon-
ic pricing model (without agent or firm effects).  The predicted sale price is compared to 
the actual sales price, allowing for a computation of a percentage measure of excess re-
turns above (below) the predicted market price.  Using this measure of excess returns as a 
dependent variable, they use OLS to test the effects of agent experience (measured in 
number of previous transactions), office fixed effects (for both listing and selling office), 
as well as other controls.  Agent experience is the key variable in the regression and is 
statistically insignificant.  Thus, they claim to find no evidence suggesting that agent cha-
racteristics influence excess returns which is consistent with the idea that the market is 
efficient and no agent is able to extract excess returns, through knowledge or abilities.  
Likewise, they find that individual brokerage offices (controlled for by fixed effects) 
have no statistically significant influence on generating excess returns. 
The principal-agent relationship between sellers and listing agents is well recog-
nized in the literature, and is perhaps best illustrated by Levitt and Syverson (2005).  
They point out that since agents receive only a fraction of the marginal increase in the 
price a higher offer would involve, there may be incentives for agents to persuade sellers 
to accept a low offer.
7
  Comparing transactions in which the agent is selling his or her 
own homes versus ones in which agents are acting on behalf of clients reveals that agents 
                                                 
7
 For instance, if one assumes a 6% commission, this is split (usually 3%/3%) with the selling agent leaving 
only 3% on the listing side of the transaction.  The listing agent must further split the 3% with his/her bro-
ker.  While this split can vary dramatically, a 50% split seems typical.  As such, an agent nets perhaps 1.5% 
on any marginal increase on the sale price.  It is plausible, or perhaps even likely, that an extra $150 to the 
agent is hardly worth the extra effort to generate an offer $10,000 higher than an existing one, not to men-
tion the exposure to risk of losing the commission entirely if the listing contract should expire before 
another buyer is found. 
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do indeed keep their own properties on the market longer (9.55 days) and obtain a higher 
price (3.7%) after controlling for wide range of housing characteristics. 
A weakness of the Jud and Winkler paper could be the lack of other agent level 
controls. Turnbull and Dombrow take a more detailed look at agent performance in their 
2007 paper “Individual Agents, Firms, and the Real Estate Brokerage Process”.  Specifi-
cally they control for agent gender, agent specialization in listing versus selling, and loca-
lized market knowledge (specializing in specific neighborhoods) of the agent.  Brokerage 
firm characteristics as well as house (traditional hedonic controls) and market characteris-
tics (monthly fixed effects) are also controlled for.  The authors find no gender effects on 
price or time on market, but do find a beneficial impact (for sellers) on sales outcomes 
from hiring agents specialized in listing and specialized in the local neighborhood.  Sell-
ing agents (working with the buyer but paid for, usually, by the seller through the com-
mission) that specialize in selling are associated with lower sales prices, suggesting a 
benefit to the buyer. 
Munneke and Yavas (2001) explore the effects of agency structure on sales out-
comes.  Since RE/MAX offices collect a flat fee from their agents rather than a percen-
tage of the commission, the authors hypothesize that better agents will self select into 
RE/MAX offices.  These agents will then attract more listings, which will lower the 
amount of time and attention available to each up to the point where sales outcomes are 
equal to those of a traditional agent.  Their empirical results are largely consistent with 
this as RE/MAX agents are seen to carry more listings, though the effect of a RE/MAX 
agent on sales price and time on market is statistically insignificant. 
While the Jud and Winkler (1994) and Turnbull and Dombrow (2007) papers are 
perhaps most directly related to studying agent effects on sales outcomes, there are a few 
other papers that are pertinent in the context of a slowly changing real estate brokerage 
industry.  For instance, non-Realtor agents have, to a limited extent, been able to pene-
trate the MLS.  The term Realtor refers to an agent who is a member of the National As-
sociation of Realtors and subscribes to its code of ethics.  Traditionally, MLS access was 
limited to Realtors but in the past 25 years, antitrust cases and the threat of further litiga-
tion has gradually opened to MLS platform the non-Realtors.  While only around one 
percent of the MLS data (from an unspecified city in Texas) was associated with a non-
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Realtor, Huang and Rutherford (2007) compare these observations to Realtors and find 
non-Realtors receive poorer sales outcomes than their Realtor counterparts.  It is clear 
that selection into a non-Realtor agent could be non-random, but these results are consis-
tent with the NAR assertion that Realtors are better agents. 
 Another fairly recent, if slowly developing, change in the industry is the emer-
gence of buyer brokers.  These are essentially selling agents who are paid for directly by 
the buyer and thus have a fiduciary responsibility to the buyer.  A 1996 survey of recent 
home buyers provides Elder et al. (2000) the data to test the effect of buyer agents on 
home prices.  They find the effect to be insignificant, though search times do seem to be 
slightly shorter. 
 
2.3 Data 
 In order to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the effect of listing and sell-
ing agents on transaction price and time on market, I obtained data from the MLS of a 
Midwestern city with a population of roughly 500,000 residents.  Information was availa-
ble for all homes listed through the MLS from January 1
st
, 2001 through December 31
st
, 
2007.  There were roughly 180,000 listings in these seven years with about half of them 
ending in a sale.  Note that this discrepancy comes from homes that are listed but then 
withdrawn before sale.  This can happen for a number of reasons.  For instance, it is quite 
common for an agent to “refresh” a listing that has remained unsold for a period of time 
by withdrawing the listing and then re-listing the same property a short time later.  It is 
hoped that the home might gain more exposure as a “new” listing.  Difficult-to-sell hous-
es might be refreshed several times before a sale is achieved.  Furthermore, home sellers 
unsatisfied with their listing agent‟s performance can sever the relationship at the end of 
the contractual period and relist with another agent.  Since many houses are listed more 
than once, it is expected that the total number of listings would exceed the number of 
sales.  Of course there are also homes that simply never sell through the MLS in the time 
period.
8
 
                                                 
8
 It is possible that some homes could have switched from the MLS to the FSBO platform.  Hendel et al. 
(2007) however, found that this type of switching occurred in only 0.2% of MLS listed homes in their data 
of houses sold in Madison, Wisconsin from 1998 to 2005. 
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 One complication that arises with re-listed homes is that re-listing distorts the re-
ported time on market.  For instance, if a home is listed for 60 days without result, is 
withdrawn, and is then re-listed and sold 30 days after that, actual time on market was 90 
days but the “days on market” reported with the listing that resulted in the sale will be 30 
days.  A new variable was created, relist, which indicates if a home (identified by ad-
dress) was withdrawn and then relisted under the same agent within two months.  If so, 
the time on market from the previous time (or times) listed is included in total time on 
market.  Note that sometimes home sellers switch listing agents which further compli-
cates true time on market.  For the purposes of this paper, time a home is listed with a 
previous agent is not included in time on market. 
 The data allow for a number of hedonic controls (see Table 2.1).  To allow for 
non-linear effects, all of the standard hedonic controls are binary indicator variables.  One 
bedroom, two bedrooms, three bedrooms, four bedrooms, five bedrooms, and sixplus bed-
rooms are dummy variables indicating the number of bedrooms associated with the 
house.  The variables, one fullbath, two fullbaths, three fullbaths, zero halfbaths, one 
halfbath, two halfbaths, three halfbaths, and fourplus halfbaths indicate the number of 
full or half bathrooms a house has in a similar manner. 
 Two-five years, six-ten years, eleven-twentyfive years, twentysix-fifty years, fif-
tyone-hundred years, and hundredplus years are indicator variables equaling one if the 
house falls into that particular age category.  House size is controlled for by the variables 
Sqft1- Sqft5.  These are variables that divide the range of square footage in the data into 
quintiles (see Table 2.1 for the specific ranges).  Acreage is controlled for by dividing the 
range into six categories plus one additional category for observations without a reported 
acreage (see Table 2.1 for the specific ranges).  Central air equals one if the house has 
central air conditioning, and pool and fireplace indicate the presence of those characteris-
tics.  The variables 2001-2007 and quarter1-quarter28 are time dummy variables equal-
ing one if the observation comes from the associated time period. 
A home‟s vacancy could have an impact on sales outcomes and thus is included in 
the empirical models.  For example, holding costs associated with a vacant, for-sale home 
imply that owners might be willing to accept a lower price if it means a quick sale.  Al-
ternatively, vacancy could have an impact in the staging of the home.  For instance, an 
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empty house reduces the (positive or negative) impact of decorating.  Unfortunately, va-
cancy is not something explicitly reported in the data.  It was observed, however, that 
agents often chose to reveal the vacancy of a home in the “agent remarks” section of the 
listing.  The agent remarks cell is an opportunity for the agent to write freely about the 
property and agents generally use this to give a sales pitch or point out specific features 
that were not covered in the basic template of the listing.  The variable vacant is then an 
indicator variable equaling one if the listing was revealed to be vacant by the agent‟s 
posted remarks.  This occurred in eight percent of the sold homes.  Given that revealing 
vacancy in this fashion is voluntary and doing so may seem to reduce the leverage home 
sellers have, it is not completely obvious why a listing agent would choose to reveal this.  
Perhaps it is viewed as something that cannot ultimately be hidden from a buyer and the 
vacancy will attract potential buyers looking for a bargain or looking to move in quickly.  
It could also be a signal of a principal-agent problem where the listing agent is eager to 
sell the property quickly and with little effort at cost to the final sales price. 
 The principal-agent problem is explored by Levitt and Syverson (2005) where 
they find evidence to support their claim that agents hold out for a higher price when they 
are selling their own homes versus when selling homes for clients.  While this data set 
does not explicitly make mention of agent interests in the property, this information is 
often revealed once again in the agent remarks cell.  Agent owned is an indicator variable 
equaling one if the agent reveals that he or she has an ownership interest in the property.  
This occurred in about one percent of the observations.  It is important to note that while 
Levitt and Syverson suggest that the higher sales prices associated with agent-owned 
homes are evidence of a principal-agent problem, there are other explanations.  For in-
stance, agents may select into houses that are generally more marketable along difficult-
to-measure characteristics. 
 This study focuses on existing homes.  New homes are often marketed quite diffe-
rently as developers tend to work with real estate brokers in a way that simply adding a 
dummy variable might not accurately capture.  As such, they were removed from the 
sample.  The sample was further restricted to homes selling for at least $50,000 but no 
more than $3,000,000.  Observations with missing or obviously erroneous values were 
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dropped.  The primary data set used for analyses begins with 64,990 sold houses.
9
  Sum-
mary statistics can be found in Table 2.1. 
 The average house was between 1499 and 1900 square feet, had three bedrooms, 
two full baths, a basement, central air-conditioning, and was 26-50 years old.  It sold for 
$171,588 and was on the market for 75 days. 
 
2.4 Empirical Estimation and Results 
 There are two hedonic models to be estimated reflecting the two sales outcomes.  
The first uses the natural logarithm of the sales price as the dependent variable while the 
second uses days on market as the dependent variable.  Observable home characteristics 
are controlled for in the basic hedonic specification with a series of dummy variables to 
allow for nonlinearity.  This approach is similar to Levitt and Syverson (2005).  Examin-
ing the ln(price) equation results that are contained in Table 2.2, one can see that larger 
houses and homes with more bedrooms sell for progressively more.  For example, all else 
constant, a home in the third square footage quintile (1499 to 1900 square feet) would sell 
for about six percent more than a house in the second square footage quintile.  While Le-
vitt and Syverson control for house size in a slightly different way (thus making direct 
comparisons difficult), the results here are qualitatively similar.
10
  Looking at the DOM 
equation, it appears that larger homes take progressively longer to sell, all else constant. 
Since sales price and time on market are jointly determined, a simultaneous equa-
tions model would be appropriate.  Unfortunately, it was not possible to find a suitable 
instrument that would influence one outcome but not the other, thus making an instru-
mental variables approach impossible.  The reduced form equations will be estimated in-
stead. 
Unsurprisingly, larger garages as well as additional full or half bathrooms are as-
sociated with higher sales prices.  The marginal effect of a second or third bathroom 
seems roughly equal (at around ten to eleven percent) but moving to the fourplus full-
baths category increases the sales price noticeably.  Despite the very rich set of hedonic 
                                                 
9
 Since some individual houses sold more than once in the seven year period, these 64,990 sold homes are 
not necessarily unique. 
10
 Levitt and Syverson (2005) use a series of dummy variable controlling for number of bedrooms and 
another series controlling for number of total rooms.  Since this data set does not provide information on 
number of total rooms, a series of dummy variables controlling for square footage was used instead. 
17 
 
controls, there are no doubt still many unobservable characteristics and perhaps fourplus 
fullbaths correlates with positive unobservables in high end homes (granite countertops, 
expensive landscaping, etc.).  Additional full bathrooms are associated with longer time 
on market. 
Older houses tend to sell for less than the reference group (2-5 years old), but the 
marginal effect of age appears to level off after the 26-50 year period.  While the esti-
mated coefficients here are smaller in magnitude that those found by Levitt and Syverson, 
the qualitative picture is quite similar including the negative effect leveling off after the 
26-50 year period.  Relative to the reference group, all of the age categories except 
over100 years are associated with shorter time on market.  This is perhaps surprising as 
one might expect newer house to more accurately reflect current tastes, be more desira-
ble, and thus sell more quickly.  The age variables in the Levitt/Syverson hedonic DOM 
equation, while larger in magnitude, are qualitatively similar and quite comparable (all 
negative and roughly consistent in magnitude).
11
 
The presence of a basement is associated with an increase of seven percent in 
sales price which is reasonably in line with other studies (for example, Munneke and Ya-
vas (2001) find the effect to be around ten percent), and homes with basements sell about 
four days faster.  Central air conditioning is worth an 11.6% premium, though it has no 
noticeable effect on DOM.  Homes with an in-ground swimming pool are associated with 
a 5.7% premium which is similar to what other studies find (4.7% to 8% in Huang 2005, 
Rutherford 2007, Stevenson 2004).  Homes with a fireplace were associated with a 3.8% 
premium.  This result is also consistent with other studies.  Neither pool nor fireplace had 
a significant effect on DOM. 
Moving up in the acreage categories is associated with progressively higher sales 
price and progressively longer time on market.  These effects are highly significant.  It 
appears that high end home characteristics, such as more acreage, more full bathrooms, 
and more square footage generally imply a longer time on market which is surprising 
since the market thins out as selling price increases. 
                                                 
11
 The Levitt/Syverson estimates range from -39.21 to -47.53.  Excluding the over100years category, the 
estimates in table 2 range from -5.18 to -7.26. 
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While it is important to recall that the variable vacant indicates a home being re-
vealed as vacant by the agent (and thus perhaps incidentally revealing the agent‟s eager-
ness to sell the home even at a lower than normal price), the coefficient does imply that 
vacant homes sell for around eight percent less.  Other estimates for the effect of vacancy 
range from -3.8% to -8.36% (Munneke 2001, Turnbull 2007, Rutherford 2005, Huang 
2007). 
Subdivision fixed effects were included in the model to the extent that the subdi-
vision was reported in the data.  There were several instances where the subdivi-
sion/neighborhood cell was left blank.  In these cases, the MLS area was used as a stand 
in.
12
  Even given the rich set of hedonic controls included in the ln(price) model, these 
subdivision effects were statistically significant at the one percent level compared to the 
randomly chosen base group 88.1% of the time.  The average value of the coefficients 
was -.367 (the average of the absolute value of the coefficients was 0.4). This result con-
firms that location does indeed play an important role in housing price.  The coefficients 
ranged from -1.24 to 1.14.  Twenty seven quarter fixed effects were also included to cap-
ture time trends and were all statistically significant (at the one percent level) compared 
to the reference group; the first quarter of 2001 (which corresponded to the first quarter in 
the data).  Coefficient estimates on these quarter fixed effects ranged from 0.03 to 0.21 
and had a clear upward trend over time. A simple regression of time on these quarter 
coefficients reveals each quarter to be associated with 0.007 unit increase in the coeffi-
cient.  This likely reflects the general increase in property values along with any inflatio-
nary effects.  Subdivision fixed effects seemed to generally have a somewhat lesser effect 
on DOM and were significant twenty seven percent of the time compared to the reference 
group. 
While physical characteristics of the house are clearly important, agent characte-
ristics are the focus of my research.  It is plausible that more motivated, experienced, as-
sertive, and hardworking agents get better sales outcomes for their clients.  Ideally, one 
would want to control for level of agent effort, skills, and experience.  Perhaps things like 
                                                 
12
 The MLS divides the city into approximately thirty geographical areas.  The MLS area is available in the 
data for every listing as opposed to subdivision information which was only provided for 82% of the list-
ings.  It appears that many of the observations with missing subdivision information were in more rural, 
outlying areas of the city and not affiliated with a subdivision or neighborhood. 
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number of hours spent by the agent on the listing or level of extra marketing (such as ad-
vertizing the home in the newspaper or other media outlets, number of open houses, etc.) 
would be interesting independent variables to include in the model.  Unfortunately, data 
constraints make controls of this type fairly limited.  Two variables that were identified in 
the data as potentially correlated with agent effort are multiphoto and relist. 
One way agents might reveal their assertiveness is by going beyond the minimum 
requirements for listing a home and such actions might be seen as a signal.  One such vo-
luntary action that is observable in the data is the agent‟s decision to include only the 
mandatory single photo of the home or to voluntarily provide extra photographs.  The 
variable multiphoto was included in the empirical model as a control for its direct effect 
as well as a potential control for agent effort.  It is important to point out that providing 
more than one photo is probably fairly low cost to the agent and as such it is clear that 
this is not the ideal variable to use to capture agent effort.  Nevertheless, it has the advan-
tage of being available.  Looking at the results, the coefficient does turn out to be posi-
tive, but is not statistically significant.  It is possible that the effect of having more photos 
is real but frequently used by agents who find themselves with undesirable homes (along 
some unobservable dimension) and use extra marketing to partially counteract this unde-
sirability. 
 It is also possible that more assertive agents will “refresh” a stagnant listing.  The 
frequency with which this occurs suggests that agents believe it to be beneficial, though 
relisting is very likely correlated with a house not selling quickly, possibly due to unob-
servable negative characteristics.  Thus it is not surprising to see that relisted homes sell 
for 1.6% less and take around sixteen days longer to sell.  These effects are measured 
quite precisely (p-value = 0.000). 
 Dual agency is quite common, occurring in twenty-three percent of the sample.
13
  
On one hand, since the same agent will be collecting both the sides of the commission, 
there is direct incentive for her to work hard in increasing the final sales price (the mar-
ginal benefit from any increase in sales price is roughly doubled).  On the other hand, 
since hopeful dual agents are always vulnerable to other cooperating agents completing 
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 Dual agency is when a single agents acts as both the listing and selling agent.  This is generally desirable 
to agents as it implies not having to share the commission fee with a cooperating agent.  In some states, 
dual agency is prohibited. 
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the transaction (and thus denying the listing agent both commissions), they may have in-
centive to persuade sellers to take a low offer if it means completing the transaction with 
one of the listing agent‟s own home seekers.  After all, receiving two three percent com-
missions on a $190,000 transaction is better than one on a $200,000 transaction.  The 
ln(price) equation is consistent with this and finds homes sold under dual agency sell for 
around 1.4% less.  However, the days on market equation reveals that homes sold under 
dual agency take nearly 5 days longer to sell, casting doubt on assertions that dual agents 
persuade clients to accept a quick, if cheap, sale.  Perhaps this is consistent with agents 
intentionally allowing the house to linger on the market to increase the probability of the 
seller accepting an offer from one of her own buyers.  Since in-house sales are beneficial 
to the selling office, there is reason to believe that this may be encouraged by the firm, 
even at the cost of a lower sales price.  This is, however, no evidence that in-house sales 
(transacted by different agents within the same firm) affect price or time on market. 
Rutherford et al.(2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2005) find that listing agents 
selling their own homes sell them for a premium, 4.5% and 3.7% respectively.  The vari-
able agent_owned was created to indicate that a listing was voluntarily revealed to be 
owned by the listing agent.  While the 2.7% premium is smaller in magnitude than what 
is found in these previous studies, the effect is fairly similar and highly statistically sig-
nificant.  The Rutherford et al. and Levitt and Syverson results do differ along one impor-
tant dimension; Rutherford et al. find no effect of agent-ownership on time on market 
while Levitt and Syverson find that agent owned homes stay on the market for around ten 
days longer.  The results here are more similar to Rutherford et al. in that, while positive, 
agent_owned is not statistically significant in the DOM equation.  While Levitt and Sy-
verson attribute this sales price premium to a principal-agent problem, it is quite possible 
that agents are simply better at initially buying homes that are more desirable (along un-
observable dimensions) and thus own homes that eventually sell for more. 
The variable holding is the number of other homes the listing agent has in his or 
her inventory.  One might expect that the greater the number of other homes the listing 
agent has, the less effort he is able to devote to each and thus the poorer the sales out-
comes.  As such, one might expect to see a negative correlation between holding and 
sales price and a positive correlation between holding and DOM.  On the other hand, one 
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might expect that if the market is functioning efficiently, on the margin, the impact of 
agents will equalize as better agents simply take on more listings until the point where the 
outcomes they are able to generate are the same across agents (see Yinger 1981).  Yet 
another hypothesis is that agents holding many listings have a better sense of the market 
by simply being involved with more houses and this knowledge could translate into better 
outcomes.  Referring to Table 2.2, holding is highly significant and negative.  It is also 
robust across various specifications.  The estimated effect is, however, quite small.  Each 
additional property being held by the listing agent reduces the sales price of the home by 
0.04%.  This translates to around a $70 reduction in sales price per house held for the av-
erage priced home.  Holding appears to have no statistically noticeable effect on time on 
market.  The median transaction involves an agent holding around two other homes at the 
time of sale (though the mean was 6.4) with a standard deviation of around 10.8 homes.  
Eighteen percent of the transactions were conducted with the listing agent holding no 
other homes at that time.  Putting this in perspective, comparing an agent at the median 
(with two other homes) to an agent one standard deviation away (with 13 other homes), 
the agent with more listings would obtain a price around $770 less on an average priced 
home.  While negative, robust, and precisely estimated, it is difficult to believe that such 
a small marginal effect has any meaningful economically significance.  Unfortunately, it 
is difficult to discern if concurrent listings genuinely have a very small effect, or if agent 
productivity and a principal-agent problem are having counteracting effects. 
Of particular interest are the recent-experience variables.  Referring to the 
ln(price) equation in Table 2.2, it appears that recent listing activity is negatively asso-
ciated with sales price.  For the most part, the recent listing experience variables are sta-
tistically significant (at the ten percent level or better) and paint a fairly consistent pic-
ture.  For each home the listing agent has sold in the past 30 days, the sales price decreas-
es by 0.16%.  This result is highly statistically significant (p-value = 0.001).  With an av-
erage home price of around $171,588, this equates to a marginal effect of around $280 
per previous recent transaction.  The mean value of recent_list_experience_30days is 1.8 
(though the median is between 0 and 1) with a standard deviation of 3.6.  Comparing a 
listing agent with one previous transaction in the last 30 days to one with five transac-
tions (one standard deviation away), one finds the more active listing agent associated 
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with a sales price of $1124 less.  The variables capturing the effects of transactions 
beyond the most recent 30 day, while still negative, tend to be around half of the magni-
tude and of less statistical significance (though still significant at the ten percent level  in 
four of the five cases). 
The above results seem to imply that more active listing agents are associated 
with lower sales price, and very recent activity (activity in the last 30 days) has a noticea-
bly stronger effect.  Interestingly, this effect is somewhat mirrored in the DOM equation.  
Once again the coefficients on the recent experience variables are negative and largely 
significant, though it is important to keep in mind that in the case of DOM, a negative 
coefficient is associated with a better sales outcome (shorter time on market).  Once 
again, the effect on the dependent variable seems to be strongest for the experience varia-
ble associated with the most recent activity.  For each previous transaction the listing 
agent has conducted in the last 30 days, DOM is shortened by .68 days.  This effect is 
significant at the one percent level.  Once again, beyond the 30 day threshold, the effect 
of previous recent transactions levels off and is roughly half in magnitude.  The exception 
here seems to be transactions occurring between 151 and 180 days previous (the most 
distant time period) which has a noticeably smaller coefficient and fails to approach sta-
tistical significance at any conventional level. 
Putting the two sales outcome equations together, it appears that more active list-
ings agents close deals quickly but at a detriment to the final sales price.  As Levitt and 
Syverson point out, agents are likely to hold an informational advantage over their 
clients.  Since these agents are likely to have strong incentives to close deals quickly 
(even if it means a slightly lower sale price) and thereby free themselves to proceed to the 
next listing, it follows that they may try to use that advantage to persuade clients into 
quick sales. 
Generally speaking, the recent activity of the selling agent appears to have little 
impact on sales outcome variables.   This may not be surprising due to the somewhat am-
biguous loyalties of the selling agent.  With the exception of the still fairly unusual case 
of the “buyer‟s broker”, the selling agent is paid by (and therefore owes fiduciary respon-
sibility to) the home seller.  Furthermore, any marginal increase in the sales price me-
chanically translates into an increase in the commission fee collected.  But the selling 
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agent‟s side-by-side interaction with the home buyer may complicate the agent‟s loyal-
ties.  For example, Turnbull (2007) finds that agents specializing in selling (vs. listing) 
tend to be associated with lower selling prices on transactions in which they are acting as 
the selling agent.  The authors posit that this may reflect the specialized selling agent us-
ing his experience and knowledge in favor of the home buyer.  It stands to reason that a 
selling agent that works hard for the home seller (and against the home buyer) by driving 
up the price may find it difficult to receive future referrals and recommendations from 
home buying clients or may even cause current clients to seek a more cooperative selling 
agent.  Furthermore, selling agents might feel compelled to assist (or at least not work 
against) home buyers simply because to do otherwise might feel like a “betrayal” to the 
homebuyers that they have worked closely with.   Since fiduciary duties and personal in-
centives can conflict, it is perhaps not surprising that the selling agent is basically neutral.  
One interesting exception is that recent_sell_experience_30days (the number of homes 
the selling agent has sold in the last 30 days) is significant (at the five percent level) and 
negative in the DOM equation.  Since faster selling times are, all else equal, beneficial to 
all parties (buyers, sellers, and agents), it is perhaps not shocking to see that agents that 
close deals often are associated with lower time on market on the selling side of the 
transaction as well. 
When examining time on market, an alternative to duration regression could be to 
employ a hazard model.  Table 2.3 reports the hazard ratios and coefficients of a hazard 
model on time to sale duration.  Unfortunately, it was impossible to estimate a hazard 
model with all of the roughly 2,000 neighborhood controls and 237 zip code controls 
were used instead.  Table 2.3 also includes results from an OLS regression with the same 
zip code control variables.  The results from the hazard model tell a qualitatively consis-
tent story with the previously discussed OLS results.  Each additional transaction within 
the past thirty days by the listing agent increases the probability of selling the home by 
1.38% in any given period and this effect tapers off as transactions get further in the past.  
Additional concurrent listings reduce the probability of a sale by a very small, yet statisti-
cally significant amount.  Again, the recent activity of the selling agent appears to have 
no noticeable effect. 
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Thus far, only general listing and sales experience have been explored.  Table 2.4 
reports regression results including agent experience variables that measure recent trans-
action activity in the same MLS area.  For example, recent_area_list_experience_30days 
is a variable capturing the number of recent transactions the listing agent has conducted 
in the same MLS area as the observation.  It is possible that recent previous activity in the 
same geographical area of the market might have some different effect than general re-
cent transactions.  The results indicate that more recent listing transactions in the same 
MLS area are associated with higher sales prices.  The coefficients for re-
cent_area_list_experience_30days and recent_area_listing_experience_31-60days are 
0.0017 (p-value= 0.086) and 0.0026 (p-value 0.011) respectively.  The coefficient for re-
cent_area_experience_61-90days was not statistically significant implying that transac-
tions 61 to 90 days previous have no noticeable effect.  Intuitively, one might expect the 
most recent transactions to have the largest and most noticeable effect though the results 
indicate that transactions in the 31 to 60 day window are more influential.  Nevertheless, 
it is interesting to note that the magnitudes on recent_area_list_experience_30days and 
recenct_area_list_experience_31-60days are similar to recent_list_experience_30days 
and recent_list_experience_31-60days but opposite in sign.  These data appear to be indi-
cating that generally agents who close deals do so at a detriment to final sales price, but 
those closing deals in a specific area of town where they do have experience do so at a 
higher sales price.  There appears to be no connection between recent area transactions 
and DOM and in both the ln(price) and DOM equations, once again, the selling agent has 
no noticeable impact. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 This paper examines the effect of recent agent activity on sales outcomes through 
an empirical hedonic housing model.  Results indicate that listing agents with more recent 
activity are associated with faster home sales, though they sell the homes at a lower price.  
It appears that transactions in the last 30 days have a relatively larger effect.  Interesting-
ly, when recent activity is more narrowly defined to listed homes sold in the same MLS 
area, the effect on sales price is positive but there is no noticeable effect on time on mar-
ket.  The number of concurrent houses held by the listing agent was also examined.  It 
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was found that an increase in concurrent listings is associated with a highly statistically 
significant negative effect on sales price, but the magnitude of this effect is small enough 
to cast doubt on its economic significance.  This is consistent with a scenario of efficient 
information flow.  Generally, the selling agent can probably be considered neutral as their 
recent activity had little noticeable impact on sale outcomes. 
 While these results present interesting findings, there are a number of directions 
for related future research.  First, given the skewed distribution of agent activity, an ex-
ploration into non-linearities in recent agent experience may be interesting.  Since the 
main results basically reverse sign when a specific geographic area is accounted for, per-
haps more emphasis could also be placed on geographical specialization.  As the data 
contain information on initial listing price, examination into the effects of recent agent 
activity on setting an accurate listing price might be interesting. 
 The large size of the data set could be utilized by examining repeat sales of the 
same house and including a house fixed effect.  This would eliminate or reduce the unob-
servable heterogeneity even a very rich hedonic specification could fail to account for.  
The large data set would also allow for one to explore models with agent fixed effects. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
        
  
    
  
n=64990 
    
  
  
    
  
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Price sales price ($) 171588.6 129881.2 50000 2880500 
Lnprice ln of sales price 11.8882 0.533121 10.819 14.873 
Dom Days on market 74.58359 67.49014 0 1010 
One bedroom 1 if house has 1 bedroom 0.003893 0.062272 0 1 
Two bedrooms 1 if house has 2 bedrooms 0.100369 0.300494 0 1 
Three bedrooms 1 if house has 3 bedrooms 0.57038 0.495026 0 1 
Four bedrooms 1 if house has 4 bedrooms 0.261717 0.439573 0 1 
Five bedrooms 1 if house has 5 bedrooms 0.05307 0.224174 0 1 
Sixplus bedrooms 1 if house has 6+bedrooms 0.009925 0.099128 0 1 
One fullbath 1 if house has 1 full bath 0.378381 0.484987 0 1 
Two fullbath 1 if house has 2 full baths 0.479274 0.499574 0 1 
Three fullbath 1 if house has 3 full baths 0.114018 0.317835 0 1 
Fourplus fullbath 1 if house has 4+ full baths 0.027589 0.163793 0 1 
Zero halfbath 1 if house has 0 half baths 0.643807 0.478877 0 1 
One halfbath 1 if house has 1 half bath 0.334605 0.471856 0 1 
Two halfbath 1 if house has 2 half baths 0.020357 0.141219 0 1 
Three halfbath 1 if house has 3 half baths 0.000939 0.030623 0 1 
Fourplus halfbath 1 if house has 4+ half baths 0.000292 0.017096 0 1 
two_five years 2-5 years old at initial listing 0.119357 0.32421 0 1 
six_ten years 6-10 years old at initial listing 0.118218 0.322869 0 1 
eleven_twentyfive years 11-25 years old at initial listing 0.166672 0.372686 0 1 
twentysix-fifty years 26-50 years old at initial listing 0.361563 0.480457 0 1 
fiftyone_hundred years 
51-100 years old at initial list-
ing 0.210525 0.407684 0 1 
Hundredplus years 101+ years old at initial listing 0.023665 0.152005 0 1 
Central air 1 if has central air conditioning 0.919403 0.273008 0 1 
Basement 1 if has basement 0.618018 0.485876 0 1 
Vacant 1 if revealed vacant 0.080274 0.271719 0 1 
Squarefootage 1 
1 if in 1st SQFT quintile 
(<=1149) 0.2 0.4 0 1 
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Table 2.1 continued 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Squarefootage 2 
1 if in 2nd SQFT quintile 
(>1150 & <=1500) 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Squarefootage 3 
1 if in 3rd SQFT quintile 
(>1500 & <= 1900) 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Squarefootage 4 
1 if in 4th SQFT quintile 
(>1900 & <=2597) 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Squarefootage 5 
1 if in 5th SQFT quintile 
(>2597) 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Acreage 1 1 if acreage <0.25 acres 0.134667 0.34137 0 1 
Acreage 2 1 if acreage >=0.25, <0.5 0.143002 0.350078 0 1 
Acreage 3 1 if acreage >=0.5, <1 0.05191 0.221847 0 1 
Acreage 4 1 if acreage >=1, <5 0.076035 0.265056 0 1 
Acreage 5 1 if acreage >=5, <20 0.027952 0.164835 0 1 
Acreage 6 1 if  acreage >20 0.00366 0.06039 0 1 
acreage_unknown 1 if no acreage was reported 0.562775 0.496048 0 1 
Relist 1 if listing was "refreshed" 0.09226 0.289395 0 1 
Dual 1 if listing agent=selling agent 0.233498 0.423059 0 1 
Pool 1 if house has pool 0.045531 0.208467 0 1 
Fireplace 1 if house has fireplace 0.300989 0.458692 0 1 
Agent owned 
1 if revealed to be owned by list 
agent 0.009956 0.09928 0 1 
2001 sold in 2001 0.123311 0.328797 0 1 
2002 sold in 2002 0.122604 0.327984 0 1 
2003 sold in 2003 0.142745 0.349815 0 1 
2004 sold in 2004 0.152716 0.359716 0 1 
2005 sold in 2005 0.141037 0.348063 0 1 
2006 sold in 2006 0.162133 0.368575 0 1 
2007 sold in 2007 0.155455 0.36234 0 1 
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Table 2.2:: Least Squares Results with White Standard Errors 
 
Ln(price) equation DOM equation 
 
n=60,141    n=59,644* 
 
F-stat= 
219.06 (P>F= 
0.00) 
 
F-stat=60.97 
(P>F=0.00) 
 
 
R-squared= 0.883 R-squared= 0.129 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
recent_list_experience_30days 
-0.0016 -3.380*** -0.680 -5.430*** 
recent_list_experience_31-60days 
-0.0009 -1.870* -0.239 -1.730* 
recent_list_experience_61-90days 
0.0004 -0.750 -0.370 -2.630*** 
recent_list_experience_91-120days 
-0.0009 -1.800* -0.272 -1.930* 
recent_list_experience_121-150days 
-0.0009 -1.980** -0.213 -1.490 
recent_list_experience_151-180days 
-0.0008 -1.780* -0.009 -0.060 
recent_sell_experience_30days 
0.0005 0.670 -0.466 -1.970** 
recent_sell_experience_31-60days 
0.0006 0.770 -0.040 -0.170 
recent_sell_experience_61-90days 
0.0008 1.090 -0.356 -1.410 
recent_sell_experience_91-120days 
-0.0004 -0.570 -0.416 -1.660* 
recent_sell_experience_121-150days 
0.0005 0.650 0.311 1.250 
recent_sell_experience_151-180days 
-0.0004 -0.550 0.272 1.080 
holding 0.0004 -2.610*** 0.043 0.920 
(onebedroom is ref group)         
twobedrooms 0.093 4.530*** 0.931 0.240 
threebedrooms 0.173 8.360*** -1.344 -0.340 
fourbedrooms 0.186 8.910*** 0.253 0.060 
fivebedrooms 0.207 9.690*** 1.431 0.340 
sixplusbedrooms 0.286 11.190*** 6.972 1.250 
(onefullbath is ref group)         
twofullbaths 0.112 41.400*** 1.736 2.030** 
threefullbaths 0.215 45.230*** 4.192 2.900*** 
fourplusfullbaths 0.489 44.310*** 13.554 4.840*** 
(zerohalfbaths is ref group)         
onehalfbath 0.094 42.170*** 3.748 5.230*** 
twohalfbaths 0.183 22.190*** 5.459 2.470** 
threehalfbaths 0.362 4.950*** -0.978 -0.080 
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Table 2.2 continued 
 
Ln(price) equation DOM equation 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
fourplushalfbaths 0.218 2.630*** 5.339 0.240 
(no_garage is ref group)         
onecargarage 0.051 19.890*** -0.405 -0.490 
twocargarage 0.104 44.860*** -0.569 -0.770 
threepluscargarage 0.238 40.220*** 3.819 2.250** 
(2-5_yearsold is ref group)         
six-ten_yearsold -0.036 -10.490*** -5.180 -4.110*** 
eleven-twenty_yearsold -0.062 -14.250*** -5.929 -3.980*** 
twentysix-fifty_yearsold -0.091 -18.310*** -7.256 -4.440*** 
fiftyone_hundred_yearsold -0.076 -11.950*** -6.745 -3.590*** 
hundredplus_yearsold -0.077 -6.370*** -0.722 -0.240 
centralair 0.117 29.060*** 0.510 0.470 
basement 0.069 30.030*** -4.033 -5.500*** 
multiphoto 0.029 1.240 18.549 2.230** 
vacant -0.081 -24.520*** -3.047 -2.910*** 
(sqft<1150 is ref group)         
sqft>=1150, <1499 0.061 22.650*** -0.581 -0.650 
sqft>=1499, <1899 0.126 39.580*** 3.209 3.070*** 
sqft>=1899, <2579 0.195 51.450*** 5.458 4.400*** 
sqft>=2579 0.346 66.740*** 6.857 4.290*** 
relist -0.016 -6.070*** -16.224 -21.210*** 
dual -0.014 -7.080*** 4.765 7.160*** 
same_office -0.003 -1.010 0.557 0.530 
pool 0.057 13.210*** -0.589 -0.430 
fireplace 0.038 21.070*** -0.403 -0.650 
agentowned 0.027 3.510*** 2.900 0.890 
(acreage<0.25 is ref group)         
unknown_acreage 0.003 1.470 2.910 3.750 
acreage>=0.25, <0.5 0.008 3.040*** 3.265 3.310 
acreage>=0.5, <1.0 0.060 12.000*** 6.469 4.080 
acreage>=1.0, <5.0 0.181 28.060*** 13.760 7.310 
acreage>=5.0, <20.0 0.384 36.560*** 14.605 5.080*** 
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Table 2.2 continued 
 
Ln(price) equation DOM equation 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
acreage>20.0 0.719 19.760*** 23.432 3.620*** 
constant 11.490 330.260 106.378 14.710 
 
Note: Subdivision and quarter fixed effects present but repressed 
* omits 497 observations for which the DOM variable was missing 
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Table 2.3: Hazard Model Results  
  
Hazard Model Results 
  
 OLS Results with White 
Std.Errors 
 
n=59,644 n=59,644 
  
F stat= 68.32 
 (P>F=0.000) 
 
p= 1.201 R squared= 0.088 
  
Hazard 
Ratio Coefficient z-stat Coefficient t-stat 
recent_list_experience_30days 
1.0138 0.013752 5.550*** -0.6697 -5.430*** 
recent_list_experience_31-60days 
1.0089 0.008897 3.440*** -0.3042 -2.240** 
recent_list_experience_61-90days 
1.0087 0.00865 3.260*** -0.3514 -2.570*** 
recent_list_experience_91-120days 
1.0058 0.005748 2.250** -0.2275 -1.650* 
recent_list_experience_121-150days 
1.0035 0.003502 1.320 -0.1921 -1.380 
recent_list_experience_151-180days 
1.0006 0.000625 0.240 -0.0403 -0.310 
recent_sell_experience_30days 
1.0071 0.007045 1.810* -0.5129 -2.210** 
recent_sell_experience_31-60days 
1.0026 0.002618 0.670 -0.1065 -0.450 
recent_sell_experience_61-90days 
1.0036 0.003573 0.890 -0.3063 -1.240 
recent_sell_experience_91-120days 
1.0077 0.007697 1.950* -0.5393 -2.180** 
recent_sell_experience_121-150days 
0.9939 -0.0061 -1.490 0.3954 1.620 
recent_sell_experience_151-180days 
0.9969 -0.0031 -0.760 0.2351 0.960 
holding 0.9979 -0.00213 -2.690*** 0.0546 1.190 
twobedrooms 1.0254 0.025121 0.390 -0.1407 -0.040 
threebedrooms 1.0783 0.075349 1.170 -2.9257 -0.760 
fourbedrooms 1.0581 0.056467 0.860 -1.6419 -0.420 
fivebedrooms 1.0351 0.034452 0.510 -0.1093 -0.030 
sixplusbedrooms 0.9380 -0.06404 -0.800 7.3230 1.350 
twofullbath 0.9674 -0.03309 -2.550** 2.0364 2.570*** 
threefullbaths 0.9150 -0.08883 -4.150*** 5.4210 3.930*** 
fourplusfullbaths 0.7939 -0.23078 -6.570*** 14.2579 5.540*** 
onehalfbath 0.9432 -0.05849 -5.500*** 3.6389 5.420*** 
twohalfbath 0.9370 -0.0651 -2.070** 4.3419 2.040** 
threehalfbaths 0.9893 -0.01072 -0.070 1.1231 0.090 
fourplushalfbaths 0.9417 -0.06009 -0.210 7.7796 0.340 
onecargarage 1.0144 0.01426 1.090 -0.6631 -0.840 
twocargarage 1.0107 0.01064 0.950 -0.1200 -0.180 
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Table 2.3 continued 
  
Hazard Model Results 
  
 OLS Results with White 
Std.Errors 
  
Hazard 
Ratio Coefficient z-stat Coefficient t-stat 
threepluscargarage 0.9337 -0.06855 -2.980*** 4.6336 2.840*** 
six_tenyears 1.0847 0.081327 4.710*** -4.6759 -4.160*** 
eleven_twentyyears 1.0631 0.061174 3.720*** -3.3511 -3.110*** 
twentysix_fifyyears 1.0602 0.058442 3.570*** -3.2871 -3.020*** 
fiftyone_hundredyears 1.0706 0.068187 3.430*** -3.1843 -2.370** 
hundredplusyears 0.9920 -0.00803 -0.230 2.2681 0.880 
centralair 1.0276 0.027234 1.680* -0.3539 -0.330 
basement 1.0802 0.077189 7.290*** -4.3398 -6.510*** 
multiphoto 0.7511 -0.28619 -2.480** 20.5762 2.460** 
vacant 1.0517 0.050364 3.140*** -2.3894 -2.370** 
sqft2 1.0113 0.011225 0.770 -0.6450 -0.760 
sqft3 0.9467 -0.05482 -3.340*** 3.2670 3.330*** 
sqft4 0.8982 -0.10739 -5.660*** 5.8119 4.930*** 
sqft5 0.8611 -0.14949 -6.380*** 8.5126 5.720*** 
relist 1.3193 0.277073 18.890*** -15.5717 -20.85*** 
dual 0.9326 -0.06983 -4.030*** 4.5351 3.960*** 
pool 1.0183 0.018146 0.890 -0.6831 -0.530 
fireplace 1.0058 0.005741 0.590 -0.3378 -0.560 
agentowned 0.9732 -0.02716 -0.650 2.9651 0.940 
noacreage 0.9347 -0.06756 -5.160*** 3.3724 4.440*** 
acreage2 0.9230 -0.08016 -4.990*** 3.7518 3.940*** 
acreage3 0.8612 -0.14945 -6.620*** 8.4042 5.650*** 
acreage4 0.7766 -0.25277 -11.63*** 15.6497 10.070*** 
acreage5 0.7732 -0.2572 -8.520*** 15.9639 6.490*** 
acreage6 0.7076 -0.34584 -4.710*** 28.2526 4.290*** 
dualoffice 0.9774 -0.02291 -1.420 0.9002 0.870 
 Note: Quarter and zip code location controls included but suppressed 
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Table 2.4: Least Squares Results for Area Variables with White Corrected 
Standard Errors  
  Ln(price) equation DOM equation 
 
n=60,141 n=59,644* 
 
F-stat= 219.34 
 (P>F= 0.00) 
F-stat=  78.71  
(P>F=0.00) 
 
R-squared= 0.881 R-squared= 0.129 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
recent_list_experience_30days 
0.002 1.720* -0.450 -1.350 
recent_list_experience_31-60days 
0.003 2.530** 0.110 0.310 
recent_list_experience_61-90days 
0.001 1.180 -0.440 -1.360 
recent_sell_experience_30days 
0.001 -0.900 -0.140 -0.300 
recent_sell_experience_31-60days 
0.001 -0.310 0.580 1.140 
recent_sell_experience_61-90days 
0.001 1.520 -1.270 -2.670*** 
Holding 0.000 -20.200*** -0.390 -14.260*** 
(one bedroom is ref group)         
Two bedrooms 0.090 4.550*** 1.250 0.310 
Three bedrooms 0.170 8.390*** -1.060 -0.270 
Four bedrooms 0.190 8.940*** 0.510 0.130 
Five bedrooms 0.210 9.710*** 1.680 0.390 
Sixplus bedrooms 0.290 11.220*** 7.240 1.300 
(one fullbath is ref group)         
Two fullbaths 0.110 41.260*** 1.690 1.970** 
Three fullbaths 0.210 45.120*** 4.100 2.830*** 
Four plusfullbaths 0.490 44.260*** 13.540 4.830*** 
(zero halfbaths is ref group)         
One halfbath 0.090 42.130*** 3.700 5.170*** 
Two halfbaths 0.180 22.160*** 5.430 2.460** 
Three halfbaths 0.360 4.980*** -0.890 -0.070 
Fourplus halfbaths 0.220 2.670*** 7.250 0.330 
(one bedroom is ref group)         
Two bedrooms 0.090 4.550*** 1.250 0.310 
Three bedrooms 0.170 8.390*** -1.060 -0.270 
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Table 2.4 continued 
  Ln(price) equation DOM equation 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Four bedrooms 0.190 8.940*** 0.510 0.130 
Five bedrooms 0.210 9.710*** 1.680 0.390 
Sixplus bedrooms 0.290 11.220*** 7.240 1.300 
(one fullbath is ref group)         
Two fullbaths 0.110 41.260*** 1.690 1.970** 
Three fullbaths 0.210 45.120*** 4.100 2.830*** 
Four plusfullbaths 0.490 44.260*** 13.540 4.830*** 
(zero halfbaths is ref group)         
One halfbath 0.090 42.130*** 3.700 5.170*** 
Two halfbaths 0.180 22.160*** 5.430 2.460** 
Three halfbaths 0.360 4.980*** -0.890 -0.070 
Fourplus halfbaths 0.220 2.670*** 7.250 0.330 
Dual -0.010 -7.100*** 4.670 7.080*** 
same_office 0.001 -1.140 0.640 0.600 
Pool 0.063 13.230*** -0.610 -0.450 
fireplace 0.045 21.120*** -0.290 -0.460 
Agent owned 0.034 3.710*** 3.350 1.030 
(acreage<0.25 is ref group)         
unknown_acreage 0.000 1.090 2.690 3.460*** 
acreage>=0.25, <0.5 0.010 3.160*** 3.310 3.350*** 
acreage>=0.5, <1.0 0.065 11.990*** 6.570 4.140*** 
acreage>=1.0, <5.0 0.184 27.990*** 13.780 7.310*** 
acreage>=5.0, <20.0 0.380 36.550*** 14.580 5.070*** 
acreage>20.0 0.720 19.750*** 23.290 3.600*** 
Constant 11.492 330.440*** 106.930 14.770*** 
  Note: Subdivision and quarter fixed effects present but repressed  
* omits 497 observations for which the DOM variable was missing 
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CHAPTER 3. MARKET CONCENTRATION IN REGIONA REAL ESTATE 
BROKERAGE MARKETS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Low barriers to entry and a large number of firms are characteristics of the resi-
dential real estate brokerage market and thus, one might expect markets to be fairly com-
petitive.  Furthermore, the Multiple Listing Services (MLS) found in practically every 
market would seem to go far in leveling the playing field since listings from small or new 
firms enjoy exposure comparable to any other firm.  The unusually pervasive and see-
mingly rigid six percent commission rate structure, which is so often reported across 
markets, is then difficult to explain, and anecdotal evidence of a non-competitive market 
structure exists.
14
  A few studies have examined concentration in a small number of mar-
kets but thus far there has been no attempt to obtain a broader picture from which a more 
general view of the brokerage industry could be evaluated. 
 The National Association of Realtors (NAR) reports that “there is little concentra-
tion in the real estate industry” and that “the top 100 real estate firms (in 2004) held only 
17 percent of the market share” (NAR, 2005).  But national measures are of little value; 
even if every local market in the country were monopolized, national measures could 
suggest a fairly competitive market.  The immobility of real estate dictates that concentra-
tion should be examined at the individual market level.  In their 2007 report “Competi-
tion in the Real Estate Brokerage Market”, the Department of Justice cites three anecdotal 
instances of markets where two firms controlled over fifty percent of listings.  Academic 
studies looking into market concentration are very few, no doubt due to lack of available 
data, and those that have been done have focused each on a single market.  Even collec-
tively, these studies give a very incomplete picture of the market structure and it is diffi-
cult to use them to draw inferences about the industry in general.  This study uses listings 
taken from the website www.Realtor.com, a listings aggregator owned and maintained by 
the NAR, to get a sense of market structure over a number of diverse real estate markets.  
                                                 
14
 See the 2007 Dept. of Justice report “Competition in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry”. 
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With this analysis, it is possible to then get a sense of the shape of the long run average 
cost curve from the size of the firms observed.  Factors that give rise to market concentra-
tion are also examined. 
 
3.2 Background and Literature Review 
 For any real market power to exist there must be barriers to entry present.  Since 
real estate professionals require licensure to operate, it is possible that state licensing laws 
stifle entry.  There are two types of licenses; agent and broker.  Agent licensure always 
precedes broker licensure and has lower requirements.  These requirements vary from 
state to state.  In California, the country‟s largest statewide real estate market, an appli-
cant wishing to take the agent license exam must first have completed three college-level 
real estate courses
15
 and pay a $25 examination fee.  Successful applicants must then pay 
a $120 annual licensing fee.  In Kentucky, primary requirements to become an agent are 
to spend ninety-six classroom hours in real estate courses, pass the state real estate licens-
ing exam,
16
 and pay the state licensing fee of $55 (www.krec.ky.gov).   In Kentucky, pri-
vate accredited real estate courses tend to range from around $500 to $750 and the state 
licensing exam fee is $75, suggesting that the total monetary cost of becoming a real es-
tate agent is under a thousand dollars and takes less than three weeks.   These require-
ments are typical for the country in general, and several of the panelists participating in 
the 2007 DOJ workshop (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007) report suggested that licens-
ing barriers are not particularly deterring, citing the general fluidity of the entry and exit 
of agents. 
 Every agent requires a broker, however, and brokerage licensing requirements are 
more stringent.  While, again, there is variation state to state, typically one must have 
been an active agent for some period of time (two years seems typical), completed addi-
tional course work (usually from a local community/technical college), and passed the 
state brokerage exam. 
Another explanation for any market concentration one might find could come 
from reputational effects.  Since buying or selling a home usually represents the largest 
                                                 
15
 These course are offered at many colleges, community colleges, and private institutions. 
16
 The Kentucky Real Estate Commission reports the pass rate for the agent exam to be 83%. 
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transaction in a person‟s life, reputational effects of brokers might have special impor-
tance.  Survey data utilized by Nelson and Nelson (1988) support this assertion in that 
they find recent home buyers to report “general reputation of the firm” to be second only 
to “agent friendliness” as the most important attribute in choosing an agent.  This is likely 
to favor established, existing firms and make it more difficult for new entrants to attract 
listings. 
Lastly, there may be some minimum efficient scale in which new firms with few 
listings are too small to compete with firms farther down the average cost curve.  If this is 
true, one might observe higher concentration in smaller markets as the small size of the 
market dictates that only a few firms can carry enough listings to reach minimum effi-
cient scale (MES).  This effect would then decrease as market size increases.  Lower con-
centration may be observed as there becomes more room for additional firms to obtain 
the minimum efficient scale.  Observing concentration levels over a wide cross section of 
markets may shed some light on this. 
The aforementioned 2005 NAR study claims that the cost structure of the industry 
is such that there are fairly constant economies of scale offering no cost advantage to 
larger firms.  The cost structure in this industry has not attracted much attention from 
economists.  Zumpano and Elder (1993) search for economies of scale using a translog 
cost function to model the production functions for real estate brokerage firms.  Using 
sales force as a measure of firm size, they find evidence of modest economies of scale 
except for very large firms (of 559+ agents).  Interestingly, they note that most of the 
firms in the sample, which come from a cross-sectional NAR survey of 279 observations, 
were operating below their most efficient scale.  Later, Zumpano and Elder (1994) follow 
a similar methodology but take into account the possibility of scope economies by model-
ing a brokerage firm as producing two products; listings and selling transactions.  They 
find that a balanced mix is the least costly type of operation.  More recently, however, 
Anderson, Lewis and Zumpano (2000) utilize a more advanced estimation technique and 
find that firms may be much closer to the efficient production frontier. 
Information on firm sizes across a number of markets may provide some insight 
on the long run average cost structure and minimum efficient scale (MES) in residential 
brokerage.  By observing the size of existing firms one can conduct something similar to 
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a survivor analysis for the industry.  This technique, first formalized by Stigler (1968), 
involves observing which firms survive and grow over time versus which firms exit the 
industry.  The assumption is that competitive pressures will cause firms operating outside 
the range of lowest average cost to eventually either change or exit the industry, thereby 
implying that survivors will operate within the range of lowest average cost.  Since the 
data available for this study (see Section 3.3) reveal only what the various markets look 
like at a given point, it is not possible here to follow firms over time and observe their 
entry or exit.  Thus, while a traditional survivor analysis is not possible, looking at the 
size distribution of existing firms across markets at a point in time may provide some 
useful insight. 
If the average cost curve is u-shaped with a unique minimum point (Figure 3.1), 
one would expect to see firms cluster around a certain size since firms that deviate from 
this point of minimum average cost would face a cost disadvantage.  Alternatively, if the 
AC curve contained a flat portion of constant average cost, (Figure 3. 2), one would ex-
pect to see firms operating at various levels between q1 and q2.  Any firm operating be-
tween 0 and q1 would be below MES and could reduce costs per transaction by expand-
ing production.  Similarly, any firms operating beyond q2 could reduce average costs by 
reducing production.  Competition will push firms to operate in the minimum cost region. 
Perhaps the most explicit look at market concentration in this industry comes 
from Forgey, et al. (1997).  They use MLS data to construct measures of market concen-
tration over four years, 1992-1995, for an unnamed Texas city of approximately two 
hundred and fifty thousand residents.  Using dollar volume of home listings that eventual-
ly result in a sale, they find the Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI) for listing firms to av-
erage 1015 over the four years and to average 725 for selling firms (sometimes referred 
to as “buy-side” or “cooperating” firms).  There is a bit of fluctuation over the time span 
as the HHI‟s range from 1069 to 951 and from 821 to 652 for listing and selling firms 
respectively.  Furthermore, two concentration ratios are calculated for the listing and sell-
ing firms: the CR4 measuring the percentage of the market held by the top four firms, and 
the CR8 measuring the percentage of the market held by the top eight firms.  For listing 
firms, the CR4 averaged around 0.57 and the CR8 averaged around 0.81.  For selling 
firms, the CR4 averaged around 0.46 and the CR8 averaged around 0.70.  The Gini coef-
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ficients were 0.848 and 0.825 for listing and selling firms respectively.  While the above 
values are not particularly startling, it is worth noting that they are for only one city of a 
given state and not necessarily representative of the market as a whole. 
Another pertinent study, by Colwell and Marshal (1986), empirically looks into 
the effects of various firm specific factors (firm size, level of advertizing, etc.) on market 
share in Champaign, Illinois.  They find that the level of a firm‟s advertizing is positively 
related the market share as well as, unsurprisingly, the firm‟s size measured by number of 
employees.  Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients are also constructed to measure market 
concentration.  The Gini coefficients were lower than that found by Forgey et al, (0.68 for 
listings, 0.64 for selling) and thus they find no persuasive evidence to suggest the pres-
ence of high levels of monopoly power. 
In finding no particularly high concentration levels, the above studies, while li-
mited, are consistent with the report “Structure, Conduct, and Performance of the Real 
Estate Brokerage Industry” published by the NAR (2005).  The objective of this report 
was to assuage the concerns of policymakers, analysts, and media observers about the 
potentially anti-competitiveness of the brokerage industry.  They point out that there are 
approximately 2.5 million real estate professionals and since nearly all work on commis-
sion, they could, in one light, be viewed as self-employed individual contractors.  The 
NAR asserts that the sheer number of agents competing for listings and sales makes col-
lusion through commission rates improbable.  If agents do compete with each other, even 
within the same firm, high levels of market concentration at the firm level may not neces-
sarily lead to uncompetitive results for the consumer.  It is likely, however, that broker-
age firm owners have some degree of influence over their agents and thus there may be 
an extra dimension over which agents can collude than if each agent were totally auto-
nomous.  Encouraging all of one‟s agents to charge a minimum commission rate would 
be one example. 
 
3.3 Data 
Perhaps the best source of local market concentrations would be, collectively, the 
local realtor associations and the associated local MLS‟s.  Unfortunately, these associa-
tions are reluctant to divulge information to researchers and local MLS access is limited 
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to agents who have paid fees/dues to the local real estate board and hold a valid state li-
cense.
17
  A wide reaching data collection effort in this case would involve obtaining 
membership in each of the local real estate boards as well as obtaining a license in each 
state one wished to have observations from, which would be extraordinarily costly.  The 
NAR, however, maintains a website, www.realtor.com, which assembles homes listed on 
regional MLS‟s (henceforth “listings”) and allows users to search/browse through listings 
practically anywhere in the country by city or ZIP code
18
.  Specifically, for a given list-
ing, basic housing characteristics, such as number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, 
the age of the home, the ZIP code in which the house is located, the square footage, the 
listing price, and the type of home (condominium vs. single family dwelling) are usually 
available along with a number of photographs.  Importantly for this paper, the brokerage 
firm through which the house is being listed is also reported.  As such, it is possible for 
one to record all the listings in a city at a given point in time and use this to analyze mar-
ket structure. 
The website Realtor.com is desirable because it is the official listing website of 
the NAR and likely to be the single most uniform source for this information.  In fact, 
NAR rules specifically create an exception for realtor.com amongst realtors wishing to 
block their listings from appearing on publicly accessible web sites.
19
  The result is that 
Realtor.com will contain all the houses in a given geographic market where the listing 
real-estate agent uses the MLS. 
Data on one hundred diverse markets were collected from realtor.com between 
October 17
th
 and December 21
st
, 2007.  The 2005 Rand McNally Atlas and the American 
Community Survey:  
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 These fees can range from a few hundred to several thousand dollars per year. 
18
 The following statement accompanies the search results at Realtor.com (Lexington, KY is used as an 
example).  “REALTOR.com® is the leading website to find real estate in Lexington or property listings 
provided by the local MLS. Here, you‟ll discover detailed Lexington listings and other featured properties, 
homes for sale and rentals in Lexington. You‟ll get all the listing details you need including home price, 
year built, pictures, number of bedrooms, and other home features for free. You can even request a showing 
for homes for sale or easily find a REALTOR® and other real estate information on REALTOR.com®.” 
19
By 2005, web-based brokers had emerged who often made available information about listings to poten-
tial customers via websites.  The NAR gave individual agents the right to “opt-out” of having their listings 
displayed by particular websites.  In response to imminent legal action by the Department of Justice in Sep-
tember 2005, the NAR changed the policy to a blanket opt-out allowing realtors to prohibit their listings 
from appearing on any website, the exception being realtor.com. 
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American Fact Finder (http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html? lang=en) 
(ACS) were used to select the cities.  Random selection was used whenever possible but 
since small towns greatly outnumber large cities some stratification was necessary.  Spe-
cifically in the case of large cities, seventeen were selected at random from the nation‟s 
50 largest.  A similar process was used to allow for sufficient representation of midsized 
cites.
20
   It was discovered that many of the small towns randomly drawn were quite close 
to much larger cites.  Since geographical separation is desirable, any towns within 20 
miles of a city with over 200,000 residents were removed and new random draws were 
taken. 
The collection process for an individual market was typically completed within a 
three day window, the exceptions being a few very large markets (Atlanta and Los An-
geles).  The maximum window was five days.  While the universe of listings at a point in 
time was collected, this basically amounts to a single observation in a time series.  It is 
possible that market concentrations could fluctuate.
21
  Unfortunately, market fluctuations 
over time cannot be addressed here. 
Table 3.1 presents a list of the observed markets in the data set.  Note that the 
markets have been divided into three categories (small, medium, and large) based on the 
number of listings observed, not population.  Note that the correlation between being a 
large market based on population size and a large market based on number of listings is 
not perfect.  City population size was used for observation selection only.  For instance, 
St. Petersburg, FL was considered a medium sized city for observation selection, but due 
to the high volume of house listings, was later classified as a “large” market.  Any further 
division or segmentation based on the size of the real estate market is based on the num-
ber of listings. 
This study focuses on the brokerage of existing homes primarily because the sell-
ing process of newly built homes is often drastically different.  For example, in a new de-
velopment it is common for one agent or firm to handle the entire development and the 
relative homogeneity of the homes likely makes the marginal effort to sell a house differ-
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 A midsized city was defined as one having a population too small to be counted as one of the 50 largest 
(less than 362,850) but greater than 40,000 inhabitants. 
21
 Forgey, et al. find the HHI for listings in their Texas city to remain fairly stable across four years.  The 
average annual fluctuation was 6.03%. 
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ent than for existing houses.  Furthermore, it is quite common for new home builders to 
vertically integrate and have a hand in the brokerage of their own homes.  Fortunately, 
the home‟s construction status is available in the data and new construction was excluded 
from the analysis. 
Since firms are identified (and differentiated) by the reported name attached to the 
listing, a potential pitfall could be discerning the existence (or lack) of competition 
among specific local brokers.  This may not be as obvious as it would seem.  For in-
stance, it is common for one city to have two or more firms operating independently un-
der one franchise affiliation (Century 21, RE-Max, etc).  While two firms could both be 
under the umbrella of Century 21, they could have separate ownership and if so, probably 
view each other as competitors.  The 2005 NAR report “Structure, Conduct, and Perfor-
mance of the Real Estate Brokerage Industry” and informal interaction with real estate 
agents is consistent with this.
22
  As such, they should be considered two separate firms 
for purposes of calculating market concentration.  Some firms, however, simply have 
multiple offices but a single owner.  For example, in a market there could be a “Jones 
Realty: North” and a “Jones Realty: South”.  It seems unlikely that these branches would 
be competing with each other and in calculating a measure of market concentration 
should probably be considered a single firm.  For the purposes of this study, franchisees 
will be counted as separate firms, but observations that appear to be different branches of 
a local firm will be considered the same.
23
 
 Defining the geographic extent of a market is often difficult and this case is no 
exception.  Many large and medium sized cities have surrounding areas which may be 
outside of the city proper but should probably still be considered as part of the market as 
housing in a particular suburban community may be a substitute for housing in the city 
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 When one agent employed through a franchised office was asked about competition with other offices 
under the same franchise system, she responded that “we treat them like any of the other realtors in town”.    
23
 As the data were being examined there were several instances where ownership across firms could not be 
easily determined.  In those cases, the associated websites were examined and occasionally a direct inquiry 
was made via an email or phone call.  An exhaustive investigation over all one hundred markets would 
have been exceedingly costly and thus a small amount of mischaracterization is possible.  When in doubt, it 
was decided to err on the side of caution and the questionable firms were marked as separate, competing, 
entities.  As such, any bias on market concentration measures from mischaracterization should be down-
ward.  Additionally, since the reported firm name was the sole mechanism used to identify the brokerage 
firm, potential cases in which a single owner owned two or more firms with different names would be mi-
scharacterized as separate ownership.  Any potential bias coming from this is also downward. 
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proper or a different suburb.  Making this issue particularly pertinent is the fact that often 
these areas are highly residential and thus likely to include many listings.  For conveni-
ence, this study‟s definition of a particular market will coincide with realtor.com‟s defini-
tion of that market.  This made the data collection process more tractable and appears to 
reflect the market size as defined by the individual local MLS‟s. 
The primary measure of market concentration for an individual market will be the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  This has been the standard measure since the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) announced its new merger guidelines in 1982.  The guidelines 
suggest that the DOJ would be unlikely to challenge any merger in markets with an HHI 
below 1000.  The guidelines further state that in markets with an HHI above 1800, any 
merger that would raise HHI by 100 points or more would likely be challenged by the 
DOJ.  As such, these two values, 1000 and 1800, have become focal points of interest.  
Since no objective rule exists to define “high” market concentration, these numbers will 
serve as guides for this paper. 
 There are two dimensions over which one can calculate market share; dollar vo-
lume and number of listings.  Both are presented in Table 3.1.  It is worth noting that dol-
lar volume calculations are based on reported asking price, not the final sales price.  
While sales price would have been preferable, data limitations make this impossible.  The 
market shares of listings for the four and eight largest firms are also reported (CR4 and 
CR8). 
 The average HHI by dollar volume was 1021 and the average HHI by listings was 
899.  In large markets, (defined as markets with more than 5,000 listings), average HHI 
(by dollar volume) was 437, while in medium and small markets (5,000-1,001 and 1,000-
0), average HHI was 879 and 1,345 respectively.  Fifteen of the one hundred markets had 
HHIs over 1,800 (mostly in small markets), thirty-nine had HHIs over 1,000, and forty-
three had four firm concentration ratios over fifty percent. 
Note that these data only allow for one to get a picture of the brokerage markets 
strictly from the perspective of listings.  A more complete analysis would measure the 
buy-side of the transaction as well but, unfortunately, the information needed to calculate 
this is unavailable.  It is worth noting that acting as the listing broker for a home involves 
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higher monetary costs and an extra level of licensure.
24
  Given this, one would expect 
concentrations to be higher on the listing side.  The results from Forgey et al. (1997) sup-
port this.
25
 
 Market characteristics, such as population and population growth rate
26
 were tak-
en from the US Census MSA estimates (1990 and 2000).  More specific demographic 
information about individual markets was taken from the American Community Survey: 
American Fact Finder via the US Census department (ACS).  The ACS generates esti-
mates for year 2007 over a wide range of demographic characteristics by city.  While the 
population estimates from the Census reflect MSA‟s, demographic information from the 
ACS is calculated based on residents of the city proper.  For large metropolitan areas, this 
implies a large segment of the market‟s population will not be factored into these esti-
mates.  Nevertheless, these data were judged to be more reliable than alternatives and it is 
hoped that they can serve as a proxy for the MSA as a whole.  This becomes less of an 
issue as the community size decreases since the ACS estimates based on the city limits 
begin to more closely match the community as a whole. 
The total number of listings across markets ranged from 103 (Montpelier, VT) to 
27,236 (Atlanta, GA), with an average of 2,927 listings per market.  There were 21,159 
different firms operating with a fairly wide breadth of size, measured by number of list-
ings.  Around thirty-four percent of observed real estate brokers had only a single home 
listing and around half had either one or two listings.  Note that in the data, only firms 
with a positive number of listings are visible, thus firms that were operating but had zero 
listings on the day of data collection cannot be accounted for.  Ninety-nine percent of all 
firms had fewer than 200 listings and only about a tenth of one percent of all firms had 
over a thousand listings.  The largest firm, which happened to operate in the largest mar-
ket (Atlanta, GA), held 2,485 listings at the time of data collection.  This firm operated 
several branches differentiated by geographical focus throughout the Atlanta MSA with a 
wide variety of types of listings.   
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 Listings agents/brokers have to be MLS members to post listings while selling agents can view posted 
listings without paying for membership.  Furthermore, broker licensure has additional requirements and 
costs beyond that of an agent and only the listing firm must have a broker.   
25
 For all three years of data they find listing brokerage to have a higher market concentration than selling 
brokerage.   
26
 See Section 3.4 for more information on the specifics of the empirical model 
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3.4 Model 
The empirical model will analyze the relationship between market characteristics, 
most notably market size, and brokerage concentration.  The basic specification of the 
empirical model is: 
 HHI = B0 + B1(listings) + B2(growth rate) + B3(avg hh size) + B4(median rooms) 
+ B5(same house) + B6(unemp) + B7(median hh inc) + B8(occ rate) + B9(owner occ rate) 
+ B10(median home val) + B11(median rent val) + B12(over65) + B13(homog index) + 
B14(hispanic) + B15(fsbos) + e 
 
The unit of observation is a market and while housing data on one hundred mar-
kets were collected, six of the communities did not meet the requirements for ACS partic-
ipation and thus, for these observations, city level demographic information was unavail-
able.  The final sample is then ninety-four observations. 
 If significant economies of scale exist, one might expect to see smaller markets 
(with few total listings) dominated by relatively few firms since the small size of the 
market would dictate that only a few firms could effectively reach MES.  If diseconomies 
of scale exist, one might expect to see an absence of very large firms in large markets as 
their size would be a hindrance compared to smaller firms.  Market size can be captured 
two ways; number of listings or population.  The correlation coefficient between the two, 
0.65, indicates a positive correlation.  Since number of listings more closely reflects the 
level of brokerage activity, listings will be the metric for market size. 
A number of other market characteristics are included in the empirical model.  
The first category attempts to control for turnover in the market.  To some extent, this is 
captured by the number of listings in the market, but a greater number of listings could 
mean higher existing population growth, more migration into the area, or simply that the 
people in a particular market move from house to house more frequently.  Growth rate is 
the percentage change in the market‟s population from 1990 to 2000 (measured by the 
decennial Census).
27
  Same house is the percentage of residents of the market reporting to 
have lived in the same house for the last year, which should serve as a proxy for the de-
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 More recent information would have been desirable but official estimates of MSA‟s were only available 
through the census. 
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gree of the resident‟s mobility.  Over65 is a variable measuring the percentage of resi-
dents in the market over the age of sixty-five, which might capture characteristics asso-
ciated with a large number of seniors.  For instance, markets in traditional retirement 
areas, like Florida, may see higher turnover due to the larger numbers of retirees that en-
ter the market for relatively short tenures. 
 It is possible that racial and cultural heterogeneity may give rise to pockets of mi-
nority groups.  This may create niche markets and be a dimension over which individual 
firms can specialize.  Two variables attempt to capture this.  First, the variable Homog 
index was created as a measure of racial homogeneity.  The ACS breaks racial composi-
tion into seven categories; “White”, “African American”,” Native American”,” Asian”, 
“Pacific Islander”, “Other”, or “more than one race”.  Homog index is calculated in a way 
similar to the HHI, in that each race‟s “market share”, or percentage of prevalence, is 
squared and then all squares are summed.  In this way, more homogeneous markets re-
ceive a higher value.  A market consisting of entirely one race would receive a value of 
10,000.  Unlike the HHI, which theoretically has a lower bound approaching zero, the 
minimum value Homog index can attain is 1,429 since there are only seven racial catego-
ries.  The percentage of the market that is Hispanic or Latino is controlled for by the His-
panic variable. 
 While there is no clear theoretical prediction as to their effect, controls for local 
economic and housing conditions are included.  Unemp is the local unemployment rate, 
Median HH Inc represents median household income in thousands of dollars, and  Me-
dian Home Val and Median Rent Val represent the median home value (in thousands of 
dollars) and median rental value respectively.  Avg HH size and Median Rooms controls 
for the average household size and the median number of rooms of houses in the market.  
Vacancy rates are controlled for by Occ Rate, the occupancy rate, and the degree of rent-
ing will be controlled for with Owner Occ Rate, the owner occupancy rate.  
Communities differ in their residents‟ propensity to self market homes.  For in-
stance, Hendel et al. (2007) show that twenty percent of sold homes in Madison, Wiscon-
sin are transacted without a Realtor while the NAR claims that overall, Realtors are in-
volved in ninety percent of home sales.  The degree of FSBO activity could have some 
implication on brokerage market concentration.  For instance, heavier reliance on self 
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marketing in a particular community will likely reduce the total number of homes availa-
ble to brokers. If there exists some minimum efficient scale it would then be harder to 
reach putting downward pressure on the number of viable firms.  Alternatively, the cau-
sation could run the other way; high concentration could encourage sellers to self market.   
Unfortunately, it is difficult to gauge the level of FSBO activity from any single data 
source, as there are a number of different ways a seller could attempt to make the home 
known to buyers.  Examples range from simply putting a sign in the front yard to more 
active marketing, such as advertising in the local paper or listing the home on a website.  
Ideally, a measure of FSBO activity would be as complete as possible,
28
 but for this pa-
per, the number of listings reported through the website www.forsalebyowner.com is 
used as a proxy.  While not complete (for instance, it clearly misses those owners who 
simply put a sign in front of their house or advertize in an alternate format), it might pick 
up those self marketers that are most actively trying to find a buyer.
29
  While there are a 
number of national websites of this type, this site is selected because it has the most list-
ings per market.  The number of FSBO listings reported by www.forsalebyowner.com for 
the market area is represented by the variable fsbos.  Summary statistics are provided in 
Table 3.3. 
 There could be concern over endogeneity with the dependent variable, HHI, and 
the number of listings in that high concentration in a market could stifle the number of 
home sellers that choose to use realtors.  To correct for this, instrumental variables is 
used, with the market population, in residents, as the instrument for number of listings.  
Results for both the OLS and IV specifications are presented in Table 3.4. 
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 One could, of course, argue that since practically all home owners have some theoretically irresistible 
price, practically all homes could be, in a sense, considered FSBOs. 
29
 While not particularly large, listing on a web site such as www.forsalebyowner.com does imply some 
cost to the seller in terms of money and effort.  A single month of listing one‟s home on the website with 
minimal frills costs $90.  Obviously, longer durations or additional marketing information or intra-site 
marketing mechanisms (pricing reports, extra photos, etc) imply a higher cost. 
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3.5 Results and Analysis 
Overall there appears to be a slight negative relationship between the number of 
listings in a market and HHI.  That is to say, as a real estate market gets larger, it be-
comes less concentrated.  According to the OLS results, on average, holding all else con-
stant, one hundred more listings in a market will increase HHI by about four points.  This 
result, however, appears to be driven by the relatively small markets.  Table 3.5 presents 
regression results from a subsample of only small markets (less than 1,000 listings) vs. 
markets with over 1,000 listings.  In smaller markets, more listings imply less concentra-
tion, but in medium and large markets, there is no discernable pattern.  These results are 
consistent with the idea that beyond some minimum point there may be no advantage to 
expansion and small markets make it difficult for new entrants to reach MES.  None of 
the other independent variables included in the model appear to affect market concentra-
tion in a noticeable way. 
Evidence of a non-zero MES is mixed, however.  If there is some minimum effi-
cient scale, one would expect to find very few firms operating at very small levels, such 
as carrying only one or two listings.  Table 3.2 outlines the composition of firms across 
markets and shows that around half of all firms had either one or two listings at the time 
of data collection (histograms are presented in Figure 3.3).  Note that since only firms 
with at least one listing are visible, it is possible that there are additional “small” firms 
which are normally active, but happened to not have any listings at the time of data col-
lection. 
Given the large number of firms operating at such a low capacity, arguing that 
there is some minimum efficient scale (beyond one or two listing) could be difficult.  A 
time series would be helpful in that it would allow one to observe the survivability of 
these small firms.  With these data, one cannot rule out the case of frequent entry of 
hopeful firms, starting out very small, that either grow quickly and achieve the MES or 
fail and exit the market.  Another possibility is that some market participants do not fit 
with the traditional model of the fulltime real estate broker and voluntarily conduct very 
few transactions.  One example of this could include vertically integrated contractors that 
buy, renovate, and resell homes, i.e. house “flippers”.  The data collected for Essay I of 
this dissertation allow for a bit of an exploration into this.  While the data cover only a 
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single market, they do so over time which allows one to get a sense of the degree of sus-
tainability of very small firms.  In the year 2006, there were around 10,000 homes sold 
through this local MLS by over 505 different brokerage offices.  Of these 505 firms, 184 
sold only one or two homes the entire year. Of those 184 “very small” firms, twenty four 
percent were not active in either of the adjacent years (2005 or 2007).  So of the approx-
imately 10,000 homes sold in 2006 in this market, only around a half a percent were sold 
by a small firm that was only active in that year.  This suggests that while very small, 
new firms do come and go, there is evidence that the typical very small firm does operate 
consistently year to year at a small capacity. 
Unfortunately it is impossible to perfectly discern if these small firms are tradi-
tional brokerage offices simply operating at a very low level or are some alternate type, 
such as a vertically integrated house flipper who brokers his or her own properties.  This 
type of brokerage firm is quite different from the traditional firm in that the real estate 
brokerage is only a small part of profits (presumably most of the revenue comes from a 
markup on the house) and thus these firms are not relevant in defining a MES for tradi-
tional brokerage firms.  Since the nature of flipping is to buy and resell a home within a 
relatively short period of time, one way to potentially identify likely instances of flipping 
is to look for homes that were sold twice within some short period, such as a year.  Turn-
ing again to the richer MLS data from Essay I, all homes that were sold for the second 
time within one year during 2006 were flagged as possible instances of flipping.  Of the 
nearly 10,000 sold homes in 2006 in this MLS, 258 were identified as potentially flipped, 
with 119 of those being sold (the second time) by a small firm.  Recall that there were a 
total of 184 small firms active in 2006 and thus over half of them sold homes identified 
as flipped homes.  It appears likely that a nontrivial percentage of small firms are of a 
non-traditional nature. 
If there is a region of diseconomies of scale, one might then expect to see few 
firms with more than some upper threshold level.  In the data, the largest firm held 2,485 
listings of a possible 27,236 in the market.  Since there are no observed firms with more 
listings, this could imply a point of diseconomies of scale of around 2,485.  However, it is 
worth noting that only one percent of firms had more than 192 listings and only one tenth 
of one percent had more than 982 listings.  One might then tentatively consider that dis-
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economies of scale begin to set in around 200 listing, with a few anomalous firms operat-
ing outside that range. 
Interestingly, Table 3.2 and the associated histograms in Figure 3.3 show that 
firms do not appear to behave drastically differently across market sizes.  All three size 
categories find the vast majority of active firms having less than 100 listings, with around 
half of all firms holding 2 or fewer.  ANOVA analysis fails to reject the null that the 
treatment group means differ at the five percent level of significance (p-value=0.098).  
The only dimension over which the groups noticeably deviate is the absolute range of 
number of listings.  The tail of the distribution gets longer as the market size increases, 
but there is very little weight in them.  Only about one percent of firms in the large or 
medium market categories have more than 200 listings. 
 
3.6  Conclusion 
Previous attempts at defining market structure in the residential real estate broker-
age industry have either been national measures of little use or specific local market 
measures insufficient for drawing conclusions about the industry as a whole.  This paper 
presents measures of market concentration over a wide, nationally representative cross-
section of geographic markets.  While some markets do appear to be quite concentrated 
(Des Moines, IA and Buffalo, NY, for example), the average HHI in the data hovered 
around 1,000, a critical benchmark for the Department of Justice.  The prevalence of the 
seemingly rigid six percent commission rate structure across almost all real estate mar-
kets raises questions, but it appears that high concentration is not the explanation.  HHI 
varies from less than 300 to over 3,000, prompting an analysis of factors driving market 
concentration.  OLS and IV estimation did not turn up any particularly influential factors, 
though there is some evidence that in smaller markets, more listings are associated with 
lower market concentration.  This suggests that there may be some economies of scale 
over some initial range of output. 
 While there is modest evidence that minimum efficient scale is positive, further 
analysis of the size of operating firms revealed that around half typically carried two or 
fewer listings, implying that any arguments of a non-trivial MES be made with caution.  
There is, however, evidence that many of the small firms may be of a non-traditional na-
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ture, such as vertically integrated house flippers.  It was also noted that individual distri-
butions of firm size across markets were remarkably similar regardless of market size.  
For example, about a third of the firms held only a single listing and only about two per-
cent of firms held more than 100 listings. 
An area for future research might involve further study into the anatomy of very 
small firms.  A time series and/or micro level data could allow one to draw more defini-
tive conclusions about their nature and survivability.  Studying concentration over time 
would also be interesting because it could shed some light on how large/small firms re-
spond to natural fluctuations in the housing market, as well as provide a better sense of 
the stability of intra-firm market share hierarchy.  Additionally, since there is variation in 
statewide licensing costs and market specific MLS membership fees, an interesting study 
might explore the connection between entry costs and concentration.  Finally, and per-
haps most importantly, a study addressing the effect (or lack thereof) of high market con-
centration on consumers could be particularly helpful to antitrust authorities and market 
regulators. 
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Table 3.1: Market Concentrations 
Large Markets  (5,001+ listings) 
City State #Listings Metro Pop HHI(Dollar) HHI(Listings) CR4(Listings) CR8(Listings) HHI Over 
1,800? 
HHI Over 
1,000? 
Atlanta GA 27,732 4,112,198  290.81 251.18 26.33 37.94 No No 
Baltimore ML 8,951 2,552,994 651.35 592.28 36.83 43.59 No No 
Los Angeles CA 8,110 9,519,338 204.27 229.30 23.46 26.97 No No 
Philadelphia PA 9,865 5,100,931 611.39 291.48 24.45 34.88 No No 
Dallas TX 7,870 3,519,176 338.73 251.68 24.32 36.33 No No 
Phoenix AZ 12,822 3,251,876 284.23 258.37 24.85 35.85 No No 
San Diego CA 6,864 2,813,833 332.80 328.31 30.10 35.42 No No 
St. Louis MO 8,525 2,603,607 550.66 483.65 28.61 35.88 No No 
Portland OR 6,792 2,159,720 364.55 347.03 27.52 39.50 No No 
Denver CO 11,637 2,109,282 176.54 165.62 19.72 28.01 No No 
Cincinnati OH 8,201 1,646,395 888.44 762.71 47.68 70.74 No No 
Indianapolis IN 10,140 1,607,486 456.68 304.80 28.35 39.99 No No 
San Antonio TX 8,951 1,592,383 255.49 234.53 21.72 33.97 No No 
Columbus OH 7,483 1,540,157 645.03 514.67 36.46 46.65 No No 
Charlotte NC 10,511 1,499,293 368.28 297.29 28.35 37.93 No No 
Jacksonville FL 10,260 1,100,491 516.29 485.87 33.66 41.43 No No 
Birmingham AL 5,758 921,106 1,000.30 784.82 40.81 51.44 No Yes 
St. Petersburg FL 7,241 246,407 224.03 221.19 24.04 33.90 No No 
Seattle WA 2,168 2,552,994 524.62 532.17 38.19 51.71 No No 
Norfolk VA 1,573 1,569,541 982.44 867.42 52.96 74.57 No No 
Salt Lake City UT 3,683 1,333,914 304.05 279.15 26.15 35.79 No No 
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Table 3.1 continued 
Medium Markets (5,000-1,001 listings) 
City State #Listings Metro Pop HHI(Dollar) HHI(Listings) CR4(Listings) CR8(Listings) HHI Over 
1,800? 
HHI Over 
1,000? 
Nashville TN 4,159 1,231,311 347.66 322.90 28.78 43.59 No No 
Providence RI 1,685 1,188,613 417.80 398.00 33.65 46.29 No No 
Hartford CT 1,178 1,183,110 617.01 528.82 38.62 50.08 No No 
Buffalo NY 1,923 1,170,111 2,337.93 1,743.98 64.64 71.09 Yes Yes 
Oklahoma City OK 4,296 1,083,346 191.85 172.64 18.18 29.03 No No 
Dayton OH 4,941 950,558 761.57 619.36 42.30 59.18 No No 
Fresno CA 3,166 922,516 661.40 620.32 42.92 53.41 No No 
Albuquerque NM 4,536 712,738 872.11 720.40 40.78 52.12 No No 
Bakersfield CA 4,489 661,645 431.43 414.48 34.19 45.47 No No 
Baton Rouge LA 2,610 602,894 685.33 696.81 44.98 59.46 No No 
Little Rock AK 1,710 583,845 675.95 507.39 36.14 56.32 No No 
Charleston SC 4,360 549,033 865.52 822.68 37.55 46.31 No No 
Wichita KS 2,639 545,220 660.12 554.79 38.84 57.79 No No 
New Haven CT 1,261 542,149 506.70 418.88 32.28 48.22 No No 
Lexington KY 2,593 479,198 660.53 671.74 39.38 56.81 No No 
Augusta GA 1,300 477,441 2,092.27 1,652.01 69.54 87.00 Yes Yes 
Des Moines IA 2,967 456,022 3,015.23 3,320.47 72.63 78.63 Yes Yes 
Boise ID 2,900 432,345 459.13 403.21 34.17 48.03 No No 
Spokane WA 2,373 417,939 871.68 766.30 42.82 58.62 No No 
Arlington TX 2,258 371,038 439.53 408.48 32.82 54.30 No No 
Salem OR 2,170 347,214 1,294.98 1,156.14 59.12 72.12 No Yes 
Huntsville AL 1,302 342,376 584.08 539.95 40.71 53.15 No No 
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Table 3.1 continued 
City 
(Medium 
Markets) 
State #Listings Metro Pop HHI(Dollar) HHI(Listings) CR4(Listings) CR8(Listings) HHI Over 
1,800? 
HHI Over 
1,000? 
Ocala FL 4,020 258,916 575.04 578.26 44.65 55.90 No No 
Glendale AZ 2,505 253,152 298.08 293.78 25.99 37.41 No No 
Lubbock TX 1,380 242,628 756.00 807.54 48.62 70.22 No No 
Springfield MO 1,868 201,437 1,796.06 1,559.82 66.01 75.21 No Yes 
Grand Rapids MI 4,529 193,671 577.55 532.38 37.62 55.27 No No 
Sioux Falls SD 1,289 172,412 819.65 763.08 48.18 70.21 No No 
Santa Fe NM 2,078 147,635 751.82 734.48 44.85 67.28 No No 
Pueblo CO 1,517 141,472 1,078.67 953.31 54.45 65.92 No Yes 
Lansing MI 2,048 115,366 1,359.58 1,156.56 60.40 74.95 No Yes 
Peoria IL 1,098 111,351 1,498.26 1,168.04 61.38 82.79 No Yes 
 
Small Markets(1,000-0 listings) 
City  
 
State #Listings Metro Pop HHI(Dollar) HHI(Listings) CR4(Listings) CR8(Listings) HHI Over 
1,800? 
HHI Over 
1,000? 
Albany GA 656 120,822 1,262.05 1,272.70 61.59 78.96 No Yes 
Scranton PA 468 624,776 1,286.99 1,129.39 58.76 78.42 No Yes 
McAllen TX 760 569,463 517.15 485.50 35.79 50.53 No No 
LaPine OR 222 447,728 509.20 558.27 36.94 57.66 No No 
Springfield IL 942 325,721 1,842.67 1,438.66 64.65 77.28 Yes Yes 
Lincoln NE 422 250,291 1,192.95 1,156.12 55.21 73.46 No Yes 
Yakima WA 669 222,581 903.24 801.26 49.18 69.36 No No 
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Table 3.1 continued 
City  
(Small  
Markets) 
State #Listings Metro Pop HHI(Dollar) HHI(Listings) CR4(Listings) CR8(Listings) HHI Over 
1,800? 
HHI Over 
1,000? 
Mansfield OH 761 175,818 1,645.88 1,437.07 70.83 83.18 No Yes 
Joplin MO 635 157,322 1,619.25 1,450.05 66.61 82.20 No Yes 
Eau Claire WI 664 148,337 754.92 716.99 41.27 64.16 No No 
Hampton VA 933 146,439 676.89 661.76 42.66 65.49 No No 
Yuba City CA 551 139,149 880.02 997.41 53.18 65.15 No No 
Goldsboro NC 412 113,329 948.13 779.65 45.87 69.90 No No 
Manchester NH 686 108,874 384.15 359.45 30.47 45.63 No No 
Sumter SC 684 104,646 877.69 782.46 45.47 71.93 No No 
San Angelo TX 400 104,010 1,378.62 1,028.13 55.00 74.50 No Yes 
New Bedford MA 530 91,849 282.22 274.75 23.21 38.68 No No 
Owensboro KY 489 91,545 1,283.84 1,161.40 60.12 87.12 No Yes 
Pine Bluff AR 248 84,278 1,869.67 1,281.63 65.73 84.68 Yes Yes 
Avondale AZ 973 79,798 286.53 255.85 23.84 39.57 No No 
Corvallis OR 289 78,153 1,011.60 920.20 52.25 76.82 No Yes 
St. Joseph MO 784 73,912 2,230.90 1,800.18 75.51 91.96 Yes Yes 
Blue Springs MO 843 55,031 940.23 807.99 51.13 64.53 No No 
Auburn AL 730 54,348 819.40 724.93 42.88 65.34 No No 
Delano CA 149 52,409 501.00 474.26 31.54 53.02 No No 
Bellevue NE 539 48,391 1,405.60 1,195.36 57.88 79.22 No Yes 
Salina KS 330 46,458 2,212.29 2,106.04 88.79 96.97 Yes Yes 
Roswell NM 279 45,569 2,571.71 2,029.87 74.91 86.02 Yes Yes 
Hutchinson KS 425 40,668 2,717.49 2,005.14 46.35 53.41 Yes Yes 
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Table 3.1 continued 
City  
(Small  
Markets) 
State #Listings Metro Pop HHI(Dollar) HHI(Listings) CR4(Listings) CR8(Listings) HHI Over 
1,800? 
HHI Over 
1,000? 
Brookfield WI 318 39,209 1,123.00 1,066.74 55.03 72.64 No Yes 
Findlay OH 402 37,492 1,913.80 1,723.95 69.90 87.06 Yes Yes 
Minot ND 177 36,682 1,679.30 1,604.71 71.19 97.74 No Yes 
Longview WA 313 36,638 2,121.24 2,091.08 76.68 88.50 Yes Yes 
Del Rio TX 211 36,582 1,022.20 1,049.25 53.55 83.89 No Yes 
Mankato MN 594 35,881 1,083.76 1,026.20 58.25 78.79 No Yes 
Clovis NM 318 33,182 2,505.30 2,250.23 81.45 97.48 Yes Yes 
Butte MT 165 31,967 1,347.70 1,119.48 60.61 82.42 No Yes 
Lewiston ID 209 31,794 1,446.48 1,313.63 62.68 86.12 No Yes 
Marion IN 383 30,363 1,300.10 1,204.01 61.10 87.47 No Yes 
Bangor ME 378 30,165 1,719.90 1,600.10 68.52 83.33 No Yes 
Eureka CA 193 25,396 910.23 854.10 50.26 70.47 No No 
Carlsbad NM 125 25,033 2,443.30 2,244.72 90.40 98.40 Yes Yes 
Grandview MO 307 24,116 1,801.31 1,297.87 46.25 57.00 Yes Yes 
Portsmouth NH 186 20,495 625.60 607.21 40.32 58.06 No No 
Blytheville AR 222 16,076 3,086.28 2,114.17 74.77 93.69 Yes Yes 
Montpelier VT 103 7,806 1,409.20 1,285.90 62.14 79.61 No Yes 
Inverness FL 608 7,248 850.85 857.19 52.80 68.75 No No 
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Table 3.2: Firm Size Characteristics 
  All Firms 
Firms in Large 
Markets  
Firms in Me-
dium Markets  
Firms in Small 
Markets  
   N= 100 
(27,732-5,000 
listings) 
(5,000-1,001 
listings) 
(1,000-0 list-
ings) 
N= 18 N= 35 N=47 
Mean number of listings per firm: 12.76 12.89 13.32 10.16 
Median number of listings per firm: 2 2 3 2 
Range of number of listings: 1-2,485 1-2,485 1-1,240 1-291 
Firms with 1 listing: 34.19% 33.89% 33.64% 37.74% 
Firms with 2 listings or less: 51.03% 51.60% 49.78% 51.47% 
Firms with more than 100 listings: 2.13% 1.95% 2.68% 1.52% 
Firms with more than 200 listings: 0.94% 0.96% 1.17% 0.09% 
Firms with more than 500 listings: 0.26% 0.31% 0.20% 0% 
Firms with more than 1,000 listings: 0.09% 0.12% 0.04% 0% 
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics           
Variable Definition n= Mean Median Min Max 
HHIListings HHI measured in listings 100 899.33 763.08 165.62 3320.47 
HHIDollar HHI measured in dollar volume 100 1020.94 850.85 176.54 3086.28 
Listings number of listings in the market 100 2899.70 1261.00 103.00 27732.00 
MSAPop 
pop of market, in thousands of 
people 99 782.35 250.29 0.91 9519.34 
Growthrate growthrate of pop 99 12.02 8.31 -12.02 122.38 
AvgHHSize avg household size 96 2.46 2.40 2.08 3.80 
MedianRooms median number of rooms 96 5.16 5.15 4.10 6.70 
SameHouse 
perc living in same house as 1 year 
ago 96 79.99 79.30 66.74 92.00 
Unemp unemp rate 96 4.97 4.80 1.60 10.50 
MedianHHInc median household income 96 41.01 39.90 28.38 82.09 
OccRate occupancy rate 96 89.01 88.89 78.51 96.40 
OwnerOccRate owner occupancy rate 96 51.27 52.64 21.28 95.28 
MedianHomeVal 
median home value, in thousands of 
dollars 96 161.44 130.90 58.30 594.90 
MedianRentVal median rental value 96 686.65 656.00 492.00 1203.00 
Over65 
percentage of residents over 65 
years 96 12.14 11.77 4.55 19.01 
Homogindex homogeniety index 94 5842.23 5429.77 3063.91 9051.44 
Hispanic percentage Hispanic 94 15.69 6.72 1.25 81.45 
fsbos number of FSBO listings 100 50.72 31.00 0.00 262.00 
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Table 3.4: OLS and IV Results with White Standard Errors  
Dependent Var: HHI (by dollar volume) 
     
  
  OLS        IV       
    
 
n= 94   
 
n= 94 
    
 
Prob>F= 0.00   
 
Prob>F= 0.00 
    
 
R Sqd= 0.501   
 
R Sqd= 0.491 
    
  
    
  
  
Variable Coef Std Err t- val  p- val Coef Std Err t- val  p- val 
listings -0.043 0.021 -2.080 0.041 -0.025 0.026 -0.970 0.338 
growthrate -4.280 4.983 -0.860 0.393 -5.126 5.663 -0.910 0.368 
avghhsize -511.936 350.251 -1.460 0.148 -480.654 360.315 -1.330 0.186 
medianrooms -93.744 429.628 -0.220 0.828 -53.334 452.812 -0.120 0.907 
percsamehouse 9.735 19.718 0.490 0.623 9.127 19.970 0.460 0.649 
unemp 30.565 42.994 0.710 0.479 29.367 44.028 0.670 0.507 
medianhhinc -13.947 14.523 -0.960 0.340 -14.675 14.809 -0.990 0.325 
occrate -12.496 21.081 -0.590 0.555 -3.791 21.564 -0.180 0.861 
owneroccrate 27.886 16.948 1.650 0.104 25.960 17.347 1.500 0.139 
medianhomeval -0.659 1.153 -0.570 0.569 -0.946 1.201 -0.790 0.433 
medianrentval -0.454 0.871 -0.520 0.604 -0.373 0.887 -0.420 0.675 
percover65 15.581 28.811 0.540 0.590 19.894 27.961 0.710 0.479 
homogindex 0.005 0.061 0.080 0.937 0.005 0.060 0.080 0.938 
perchisp 2.796 5.481 0.510 0.611 2.939 5.581 0.530 0.600 
fsbos -0.426 1.312 -0.320 0.746 -0.844 1.568 -0.540 0.592 
constant 2427.968 2093.145 1.160 0.250 1465.254 2260.566 0.650 0.519 
6
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Table 3.5: OLS and IV Results by Subsample 
Dependent Var: HHI (by dollar volume)  
  Results for Small Markets (1,000 listings or less)   Results for Medium and Large market (>1,000 listings) 
  OLS      IV     OLS      IV     
    n= 40   n= 40 
 
n= 54   n= 54 
    Prob>F= 0.00   Prob>F= 0.00 
 
Prob>F= 0.00   Prob>F= 0.00 
    R Sqd= 0.667   R Sqd= 0.636 
 
R Sqd= 0.398   R Sqd= 0.393 
    
 
    
 
  
  
    
 
  
Variable Coef Std Err p- val Coef Std Err p- val Coef Std Err p- val Coef Std Err p- val 
listings -0.720 0.484 0.150 -1.301 0.739 0.091 -0.050 0.033 0.139 -0.065 0.052 0.225 
growthrate 1.370 9.053 0.881 4.743 8.710 0.591 6.656 12.621 0.601 10.010 16.262 0.542 
avghhsize -409.752 839.900 0.630 -598.77 836.991 0.482 -691.78 463.884 0.144 -756.21 485.922 0.128 
medianrooms 53.432 437.753 0.904 91.887 493.345 0.854 -68.555 861.650 0.937 -87.866 877.260 0.921 
percsamehouse -28.773 29.410 0.338 -24.897 31.003 0.430 59.720 54.355 0.279 65.257 59.378 0.279 
unemp -4.063 79.717 0.960 10.386 78.533 0.896 40.964 65.910 0.538 42.472 67.400 0.532 
medianhhinc 0.265 31.054 0.993 -0.575 33.460 0.986 -29.309 28.113 0.304 -33.089 31.042 0.293 
occrate 16.783 52.614 0.753 17.946 55.780 0.751 -20.493 32.977 0.538 -32.578 46.231 0.485 
owneroccrate 28.064 16.143 0.096 27.569 15.648 0.091 21.811 45.544 0.635 27.472 52.863 0.606 
medianhomeval -5.089 2.980 0.101 -5.577 2.935 0.070 -0.030 1.624 0.985 0.291 1.509 0.848 
medianrentval -0.140 2.297 0.952 0.121 2.421 0.960 0.181 1.407 0.898 0.234 1.458 0.873 
percover65 58.686 51.894 0.270 41.863 54.302 0.449 -57.556 64.670 0.379 -72.641 81.186 0.377 
homogindex -0.173 0.115 0.147 -0.170 0.121 0.172 0.077 0.093 0.413 0.075 0.096 0.439 
perchisp -3.856 11.206 0.734 -4.640 10.200 0.653 -2.479 7.282 0.735 -2.608 7.424 0.727 
fsbos -1.789 2.919 0.546 -1.514 2.707 0.581 -0.960 1.623 0.558 -0.747 1.773 0.676 
constant 2962.97 4312.16 0.50 3161.78 4694.61 0.51 165.35 3272.55 0.96 1011.79 4250.95 0.81 
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Figure 3.1: Long Run Average Cost with a Unique 
Minimum 
 
Figure 3.2: Long Run Average Cost with a 
Range of Constant Average Costs 
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of Firm Size 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Histogram of Firm Size (Large Markets Only) 
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Figure 3.5: Histogram of Firm Size (Medium Markets Only) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Histogram of Firm Size (Small Markets Only) 
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CHAPTER 4. JUST-BELOW PRICING IN THE CONTEXT OF RESIDENTIAL 
REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE 
4.1 Introduction 
 The prevalence of “just-below” pricing (prices that are set below some even 
amount, such as $9.99, $499, etc) is well documented across a wide range products and 
does not happen by chance.  This essay explores the pervasiveness and the effectiveness 
of just-below pricing in the context of residential real estate transactions. 
 The marketing literature has long since recognized the use of just-below pricing 
and several studies show it can increase demand.  These studies generally deal with fairly 
inexpensive consumer goods (cans of tuna, hairdryers, etc) that are unlikely to represent a 
large share of an individual‟s budget.  The effectiveness of just-below pricing in these 
settings is perhaps not totally unexpected given that many of the proposed explanations 
of the phenomenon generally rely on consumers imprecisely processing or remembering 
the price; something more likely to happen with relatively small transactions where the 
marginal cost of less scrutiny is relatively low.  Very few papers have looked into the ef-
fectiveness of just-below pricing in the context of larger purchases to see if the effects are 
similar.  Two that examine just-below pricing in the housing market reach opposing con-
clusions as to the effect of such strategic pricing, suggesting that more work in this area 
may be called for.  This paper weighs in on the issue and finds evidence that just-below 
prices do have a beneficial impact on final selling price and little consistent effect on time 
on market. 
 
4.2 Background and Literature Review 
 
4.2.1 Do Home Sellers Use Just-Below Pricing Gimmicks? 
Sellers try to maximize final sales price and minimize time on the market.  It might be 
assumed that any strategic pricing strategy is an effort to influence one or both of those 
outcomes.  The frequency with which just-below pricing is used implies that it is an in-
tentional pricing strategy to improve sales outcomes. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the most common four-digit endings of initial asking price in the 
sample of homes transacted through the MLS of a large Midwestern city from 2001 to 
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2007 (see Section 4.3 for a detailed description of the data).  If all integer prices were 
equally likely, the probability of observing any particular four digit ending would be 
1/1000. In the sample, the most common four digit ending for an asking price was 9,900 
(i.e. $89,900,  $149,900, etc).   Twenty-three percent of all homes listed in the MLS had 
prices ending in those particular four digits with slightly over thirty percent of listings 
ending in some price within $100 below a $10,000 increment (i.e. priced at $89,950, 
$89,999, etc.).  The second most common ending, comprising roughly eleven percent of 
the sample, was also a just-below price (4,900) coming in right under $5,000 incremental 
focal points.  The 9,000 ending also came in as a frequently observed price ending (near-
ly six percent of listings) and might also be considered a just-below price.  Figures 4.3 
through 4.6 are histograms around focal points.  They illustrate the clear tendency to 
price just below a $10,000, and to a lesser extent $5,000, increment. 
 While many homes were priced within $100 directly below a $10,000 increment, 
pricing right on the increment did occur, happening a little more than four percent of the 
time (refer to Figure 4.1).  Pricing directly above the $10,000 increment (within $100) 
was, however, very rare, occurring in only 0.7% of listings.  Thus home sellers (and real-
tors) are generally eager to price directly below a $10,000 or $5,000 focal point, some-
times price on it, but are reluctant to price directly above it. 
 
4.2.2  Why Might Just-Below Prices Be Effective? 
 The marketing literature has clearly recognized the existence of just-below pric-
ing.  Studies by Anderson and Simester (2003), Schindler and Kirby (1997), Stivings and 
Winer (1997), Kruel (1982),Twedt (1965), and others, show that the number nine is over-
represented as a rightmost digit in a wide range of retail contexts.  The origins of this 
practice are not entirely clear, but one frequent explanation is that it was first created to 
reduce employee theft by forcing the clerk to issue change and engage the cash register 
thereby making it more difficult to simply pocket the payment from the customer
30
.  Ac-
cording to this story, an unexpected increase in demand was recognized and just-below 
pricing was adopted by other retailers. 
                                                 
30 
This notion is discussed in Sturdivant (1970), Twedt (1965), and elsewhere. 
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 Many current researchers believe that there is a psychological element to just-
below pricing, though there are several different hypotheses as to how exactly it affects a 
consumer‟s perception of the transaction.  Following Anderson and Simester (2003), 
most of these arguments can be generalized into two categories
31
. 
The first type involves the just-below price signaling a discount or bargain price.  
This is sometimes referred to as “image effects” (Stivings and Winer, 1997 and others).  
Stiving (2000), Quigly and Notarantonio (1992), Schindler and Kibarian (2001), and 
Gendenk and Sattler (1999) all find evidence that consumers perceive an association be-
tween a price ending in “99” and the good either being on sale or a retailer actively trying 
to compete on price.  Along similar lines, Schindler (1984) finds evidence that consumers 
are more likely to view a price ending in 99 as one that has not been recently increased.  
Schindler (2005) finds justification for the perception of an association between just-
below prices and discounts as he notes a statistically significant positive correlation be-
tween just-below prices and discount cues (i.e. “year end sale”, “20% off”, etc.) in news-
paper advertisements. 
 The other general view researchers take on just-below pricing, which is some-
times referred to as “level effects”, asserts that consumers imperfectly process prices and 
a just-below price capitalizes on this by making small deviations from a round price seem 
larger (i.e. the difference between $9.99 and $10.00 seems larger than $0.01).  The story 
here alleges that individuals are constantly bombarded with information but since memo-
ry and mental processing capacity are finite, consumers attempt to use mental shorthand 
when assessing price information and just-below prices cause buyers to underestimate the 
price.  Two such methods of mental shorthand are rounding and truncating, and both re-
sult in round (or closer to round) numbers which are easier to remember
32
.  Interestingly, 
                                                 
31
 Beyond the two general categories outlined here, Thaler and Sunstein discuss the possibility that individ-
uals use broad strokes to whittle down an overwhelming numbers of options (2008).  For example, in a 
large city there may be thousands of homes listed for sale.  For better or worse, one might choose to elimi-
nate large groups that are outside some range.  Such rules have the potential to be somewhat arbitrary, such 
as a person only looking at houses under $200,000.  While it may be argued that houses priced at $199,900 
versus $200,000 differ in price in no appreciable way, it is possible that a person operating under an “under 
$200,000” rule would choose the $199,900 house over the $200,000 house despite the negligible price dif-
ference. 
32
 Schindler (1984) finds in a laboratory setting that consumers have a poorer memory for non-even prices 
compared to even ones.  Furthermore, the recall error associated with non-even prices was more likely to be 
downward thereby resulting in more underestimation of the price compared to even-priced items. 
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if consumers use only the rounding technique, the perceived price is actually higher than 
the just-below price (i.e. $499 gets rounded to $500).  Some researchers have suggested 
that truncation is less costly in terms of mental effort since there is no rounding rule to 
recall and implement (i.e. round down if the last digit is 0 to 4 and round up if the last 
digit is 5 to 9).  Brenner and Brenner (1982) provide evidence that individuals process 
information left to right with decreasing emphasis on digits as one moves to the right.  If 
people truncate, the perceived price will most often be lower than the actual price.
33
  For 
instance, $499 will be perceived as $490 or, in extreme cases, $400.  Work by Gabor and 
Grangers (1964), Lamber (1975), Schindler and Kibarian (1993) provide support for the 
assertion that the right-most digit in a price is either ignored or at least less carefully 
processed.  This could have a particularly pronounced effect on consumers comparing 
products side by side.  For instance, two competing products priced at $999 vs. $1,000 
are only a tenth of a percent apart in price, but could be perceived as $10 or even $100 
apart depending on how many digits are truncated.
34
   
 
4.2.3 How Effective is Just-Below Pricing in a Retail Context? 
 A number of studies suggest just-below pricing can have a positive impact on 
demand.  Schindler and Kibarian (1996) and Anderson and Simester (2003) are able to 
conduct similar controlled experiments with women‟s clothing catalogs.  In both studies, 
cooperation with the clothing companies allowed them to issue different versions of the 
catalog randomly.  One version of the catalog had just-below prices on a number of items 
(i.e. $59.99) while another version had whole prices (i.e. $60.00).  The catalogs were oth-
erwise identical and received orders could be matched with the type of catalog the cus-
tomer had received (experiment vs. control).  In all cases, the just-below priced items 
outsold their control counterparts, sometimes by as much as fifteen percent.  
Stiving and Winer (1997) and Kaylanam and Shively (1998) find just-below pric-
ing to have a positive effect on demand for inexpensive grocery items (coffee, bathroom 
tissue, tuna, etc).  Gendall, Holdershaw, and Garland (1997) likewise find 9-ending prices 
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 The exception being when a truncated digit is a zero. 
34
 Stiving and Winer (1997) illustrate another interesting consequence of truncation by comparing the fol-
lowing two pairs of prices; $0.93 vs. $0.79 and $0.89 vs. $0.75.  Even though the difference is fourteen 
cents in both cases, the low price in the first pair may seem like a relatively better bargain compared to the 
second pair if all last digits are truncated. 
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to be associated with higher demand over a range of retail products (frozen chicken, 
cheese, hairdryers, etc).  The effect tended to be stronger for the lower-priced items.  
Since most explanations of a just-below effect hinge on incomplete mental processing of 
the price, it is perhaps unsurprising that sales of inexpensive items appear to be more af-
fected since they represent a relatively small share of one‟s total budget.   
 
4.2.4 How Effective is Just-Below Pricing in a Real Estate Context? 
 Two studies specifically attempt to determine the effect of just-below pricing on 
the sales outcomes of sold homes, and they reach opposite conclusions. 
 The first, by Allen and Dare (2004), uses MLS data from 2000 and 2001 in Bro-
ward County, Florida.  They construct a housing hedonic with logged final transaction 
price as the dependent variable.  The independent variables of interest were a series of 
dummy variables capturing homes that were initially priced at specific just-below focal 
points (i.e. prices ending in 9,900,  9,000,  4,900, or some other just-below price).  They 
find fairly consistent evidence that the use of just-below pricing is associated with a high-
er final transaction price.  Recognizing the possibility that transactions in different parts 
of the price distribution might behave differently, they divide the sample into four sepa-
rate subjectively determined groups.  For the bottom three ($0-$300,000 initial listing 
price) the coefficients on the just-below dummy variables were exclusively positive and 
nearly always statistically significant at the five percent level.  Coefficient estimates 
ranged from 0.0262 to 0.0807 and averaged 0.0427.  The largest coefficients across the 
three groups were the ones indicating a price ending in 9,000.  While transactions of 
houses in the first three groups all behaved similarly, the results for the top group, homes 
listed for $300,001 and above (truncated at $1,000,000) appeared to receive no beneficial 
effect from a just-below price.  In fact, the coefficients on the dummy variables indicating 
a price ending in 4,900 and 900 (excluding 9,900 and 4,900) were statistically significant 
and negative suggesting a just-below price may in some cases reduce final sales price. 
 As a robustness check, the authors respecify the model to include dummy va-
riables that indicate even pricing (i.e. “D0000”=1 if the price ends in 0,000) in place of 
the variables indicating just-below pricing.  They find explicitly that homes with even 
prices sell for less in the $0-$300,000 range).  One weakness of the paper is that only the 
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sales price outcome is considered.  Presumably sellers care not only about the price but 
also about time on market and an examination of how the just-below pricing affected 
time on market would have been interesting. 
 The second paper to examine real estate just-below pricing by Palmon, Smith, and 
Sopranzetti (2004) uses MLS data from a particular school district in a Houston, TX sub-
urb from 1992 to 1995.  The authors note that 51.86% of the listings are priced just below 
an even price ending.
35
  A housing hedonic was created, with logged transaction price as 
the dependent variable, including a dummy variable for a just-below price (defined as a 
price within $100 below a $1,000 increment) and another one for an even ending price 
(defined as a price ending in 000).  They find that while the just-below price is associated 
with a higher final transaction price, the coefficient is small (0.007) and statistically in-
significant.  The coefficient on the dummy variable associated with an even ending price, 
however, was 0.018 and statistically significant (five percent level).  The authors com-
ment that while listings prices are heavily clustered around a just-below price, those that 
are priced on an even point (000 ending) sell for 1.8% more.  This is inconsistent with the 
results of Dare and Allen (2004). 
 Palmon et al. then turn to marketing time and use the same hedonic but with days 
on market as the dependent variable.  They find that houses with a just-below price take, 
on average, 7.865 days longer to sell.  This result was statistically significant.  Houses 
with an even ending, however, sold faster (1.2 days) on average, though this result was 
not statistically significant.  The above results suggest sellers should stay away from just-
belows and price on even points.   
 One factor to consider with this study is that the sample may not be particularly 
representative.  Data were drawn from a fairly narrow group of houses (a single school 
district) which undoubtedly limited the heterogeneity of observations.  Furthermore, Al-
len and Dare show evidence that a strategic pricing effect can behave differently across 
price ranges, which is not addressed in the Palmon et al. study. 
 
                                                 
35 
They define a just-below price as one within $100 below a $1,000 increment.  In other words, any price 
with a “9” in the third digit from the right is considered a just-below price. 
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4.3 Data 
The data used in this essay are the same as that used in Essay I.  They were ob-
tained from the MLS of a Midwestern city with a population of roughly 500,000 resi-
dents.  Information was available for all homes listed through the MLS from January 1
st
, 
2001 through December 31
st
, 2007.  There were roughly 180,000 listings in these seven 
years with about half of them ending in a sale.  Note that this discrepancy comes from 
homes that are listed but then withdrawn before sale.  This can happen for a number of 
reasons.  For instance, it is quite common for an agent to “refresh” a listing that has re-
mained unsold for a period of time by withdrawing the listing and then re-listing the same 
property a short time later.  It is hoped that the home might gain more exposure as a 
“new” listing.  Difficult-to-sell houses might be refreshed several times before a sale is 
achieved.  Furthermore, home sellers unsatisfied with their listing agent‟s performance 
can sever the relationship at the end of the contractual period and relist with another 
agent.  Since many houses are listed more than once, it is expected that the total number 
of listings would exceed the number of sales.    Of course there are also homes that simp-
ly never sell through the MLS in the time period.
36
 
 The hedonic controls are presented in Table 4.1.  To allow for non-linear effects, 
all of the standard hedonic controls are binary indicator variables.  One bedroom, two 
bedrooms, three bedrooms, four bedrooms, five bedrooms, and six plus bedrooms are 
dummy variables indicating the number of bedrooms associated with the house.  The va-
riables, one fullbath, two fullbaths, three full baths, zero half baths, one half bath, two 
half baths, three half baths, and four plus half baths indicate the number of full or half 
bathrooms a house has in a similar manner. 
 Two-five years, six-ten years, eleven-twentyfive years, twentysix-fifty years, fif-
tyone-hundred years, and hundred plus years are indicator variables equaling one if the 
house falls into that particular age category.  House size is controlled for by the variables 
Sqft1- Sqft5.  These are variables that divide the range of square footage in the data into 
quintiles (see Table 4.1 for the specific ranges).  Acreage is controlled for by dividing the 
range into six categories plus one additional category for observations without a reported 
                                                 
36
 It is possible that some homes could have switched from the MLS to the FSBO platform.  Hendel et al. 
(2007) however, found that this type of switching occurred in only 0.2% of MLS listed homes in their sam-
ple of houses sold in Madison, Wisconsin from 1998 to 2005. 
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acreage (see Table 4.1 for the specific ranges).   Centralair equals one if the house has 
central air conditioning, and pool and fireplace indicate the presence of those characteris-
tics.  The variables 2001-2007 and quarter1-quarter28 are time dummy variables equal-
ing one if the observation comes from the associated time period. 
 This study focuses on existing homes.  New homes are often marketed quite diffe-
rently as developers tend to work with real estate brokers in a way that simply adding a 
dummy variable might not accurately capture.  As such, they were removed from the 
sample.  The sample was further restricted to homes selling for at least $50,000 but no 
more than $3,000,000.  Observations with missing or obviously erroneous values were 
dropped.   The primary data set used for analysis begins with 64,990 sold houses.
37
  A 
particularly common and pertinent source of potential reporting error came in the form of 
large discrepancies between listing price and reported selling price.  While one may fully 
expect list and sales price to differ, there were around 5,000 houses in which the reported 
list price deviated from the reported final sales price by more than thirty percent.
38
  Since 
it was judged more likely that these cases represent reporting error than wildly mispriced 
houses, they were removed from the sample.  Other observations had missing values for 
the initial listing price and were likewise removed, leaving 57,716 observations.  Sum-
mary statistics can be found in Table 4.1. 
 The average house was between 1499 and 1900 square feet, had three bedrooms, 
two full baths, a basement, central air-conditioning, and was 26-50 years old.  It sold for 
$170,522 and was on the market for 72 days. 
 
4.4 Analysis 
 Table 4.2 presents unconditional means of sales outcomes evaluated at $5,000 
intervals of list price from $80,000 to $300,000.
39
  Column (2) illustrates the tendency for 
sellers to price directly below $10,000 increments.  For example, there were 884 homes 
listed at an amount within $100 below $100,000, but only 90 listed right at $100,000.
40
  
                                                 
37
 Since some individual houses sold more than once in the seven year period, these 64,990 sold homes are 
not necessarily unique. 
38
 For instance, one house was reported as having an original list price of $49,900 but allegedly sold for 
$235,000.  Cases like this are almost certainly examples of recording error. 
39
 This covers 80.53% of all observations. 
40
 720 of the 884 were priced specifically at $99,900. 
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On $10,000 increments, the average ratio of just-below prices to even prices was 8.63 to 
1.  For $5,000 increments (excluding those that are also $10,000 increments), the average 
ratio of just-below to even prices was 1.54 to 1. 
 Column (3) presents the average amount the sellers at and just below a certain 
price point came down from the initial asking price to complete the transaction.  In other 
words, it is list price minus sales price.  In most transactions, the list price appears to be a 
starting point for negotiation and 73.1% of homes in this sample sold for an amount be-
low the initial asking price.
41
  As such, one would fully expect values in this column to be 
positive.  Larger values imply a larger reduction in price and thus a lower final transac-
tion price. 
 If just-below prices have a beneficial impact on final sales price, one would ex-
pect the list price minus sold price value to be smaller for the just-below prices compared 
to their associated even price.  Columns (3) and (6) show this is sometimes, but not al-
ways, the case.  In thirty-one of the forty-five instances, the just-below price was asso-
ciated with a smaller price reduction implying a higher sales price.  Using ANOVA to 
test differences in means at each focal point, column (5) shows that the means were sta-
tistically different (at the ten percent level or better) in nine of the instances.  In eight of 
those statistically significant cases the just-below price implied a higher sales price. 
 Based on the explanations suggested in the marketing literature concerning round-
ing and truncation, one might expect to see any just-below pricing effects to have a 
stronger effect at the $10,000 increments compared to the $5,000 ones.  Limiting the 
analysis to only these twenty-three focal points, one finds the just-below price to be asso-
ciated with a higher sales price fifteen times, with six of those differences being signifi-
cantly different at the ten percent level (and one instance a significantly different mean 
with the even price being associated with a higher sales price). 
 By looking at the unconditional means, it appears that there may be modest evi-
dence of a beneficial effect of just-below pricing on final transaction price, though this is 
only half of the story.  Columns (7) through (10) illustrate a similar analysis focusing on 
the time on market.  If the just-below price is to have a beneficial effect along this dimen-
                                                 
41
 12.7% of homes in the sample sold for exactly the asking price, and 14.2% sold for an amount greater 
than what was initially listed. 
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sion, one would expect shorter marketing durations associated with the just-below priced 
homes.  Of the forty-five focal points, the just-below priced homes sold quicker, on aver-
age, twenty-six times, with seven of those instances representing statistically significant 
differences (ten percent level or better).  Nineteen times the even priced houses sold fast-
er with two of those instances representing a statistically significant difference (ten per-
cent level or better).  Looking at just the subsample of focal points on $10,000 incre-
ments, the just-below priced homes sold faster in ten of the twenty-three possibilities (on-
ly one of the ten  represented a statistically significant difference at the five percent lev-
el).  Of the thirteen times the even priced homes sold faster, this difference was signifi-
cant at the ten percent level (or better) twice.  It appears that the data do not suggest a 
clear just-below pricing effect on marketing time working in either direction. 
 Table 4.3 presents similar unconditional averages, but rather than group similar 
prices together (i.e. all prices in a $100 range directly below an even focal point), only 
specific pricing points are examined.  The results here are qualitatively similar to those 
discussed above. 
  Allen and Dare conclude just-below pricing leads to higher sales prices.  Palmon 
et al. conclude even pricing generates higher sales price and shorter time on market.  
Thus far, the analysis here has not strongly supported either side but perhaps is more in 
line with Allen and Dare.  A fairly standard housing hedonic was constructed to more 
closely mirror the approach taken in these previous papers.  Table 4.4 presents the perti-
nent results from these hedonic regressions including variables indicating particular price 
endings.  99xx equals “1” if the price ends in a value between 9,900 and 9,999.  9000 
equals “1” if the last four digits in the price were 9,000.  49xx equals “1” if the price ends 
in a value between 4,900 and 4,999.  5000 equals “1” if the price ends in 5,000.  0000 
equals “1” if the price ends in 0,000.42  Following Allen and Dare, the sample has been 
broken up into subjectively determined price segments ($50,000-$100,000, $100,001-
$200,000, $201,000-$300,000, $300,001-$400,000). 
 The use of a 9,9xx ending or a 9,000 ending is associated with a higher final sales 
price in all four pricing categories (up to $400,000).  The estimates generally indicate a 
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 Complete regression results for the pricing around $100,001-$200,000 can be found in the appendix, 
Table A1.  Results from the other pricing groups are available upon request. 
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one to two percent premium with either a 9,9xx or a 9,000 ending, the exception being 
the relatively large premium (7.8%) associated with the 9,9xx ending in houses listing 
under $100,000.  Perhaps since the vast majority of homes in this pricing category have a 
five digit price, emphasis is placed on the third digit from the right.  Beyond this pricing 
group, home prices are six digits which perhaps directs attention away from the third di-
git towards the fourth.  This price premium does not always come without a cost howev-
er; statistically noticeable increases in time on market were often identified, particularly 
in homes under $200,000.  This trade-off is probably a good one for most sellers; the av-
erage sales price for a home in the second price group was $140,649.  The 1.6% premium 
associated the 9,9xx price implies an extra $2,250 in exchange for around two additional 
days on the market.  Neither 99xx nor 9000 had a statistically noticeable effect on market-
ing time for homes above $200,000. 
 Generally there was little noticeable effect associated with pricing one‟s home at a 
$5,000 increment or directly below it.  In the homes listing between $201,000 and 
$300,000, 49xx was associated with a 1.3% price penalty, and in the $300,001 to 
$400,000 range, it was associated with a slightly shorter (3.7 days) time on market.  
These exceptions notwithstanding, it is difficult to argue using a 4,900 ending has a 
strong overall effect.  Pricing directly on a $5,000 increment appears to have no noticea-
ble effect in either direction on either sales outcome over any price range. 
 In contrast to Palmon et al.‟s findings, the results here provide little incentive for a 
seller to price right on a $10,000 increment.  Doing so is associated with a remarkably 
consistent 1.6-1.7% price penalty on homes under $300,000 with no effect on marketing 
time throughout the entire range. 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 Just-below pricing can be found over a very wide range of items for the routine 
(grocery and retail goods) to the infrequent (houses).  Existing research on just-below 
pricing in real estate is conflicting and this study weighs in by examining the prevalence 
and effectiveness of just-below pricing in the residential real estate transactions of a large 
Midwestern city.  It reinforces the assertion that home sellers (and their real estate agents) 
frequently use just-below pricing and can lead to higher final transaction price.  In com-
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paring unconditional means between homes priced right on and just below various focal 
points, it appears that those priced below the focal point obtained higher sales price. 
Regression results support this and find homes priced directly below a $10,000 
price point (i.e. priced at $89,900, $149,999, etc) receive a premium of between 1% and 
7.8%.  Some results, particularly those involving homes priced below $200,000, indicate 
a slightly longer time on market when using a just-below price, but this effect is some-
what sporadic and inconsistent. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
  
    
  
n=56,716 
    
  
  
    
  
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
price sales price ($) 170522.6 129881.2 50000 2880500 
lnprice ln of sales price 11.8882 0.533121 10.819 14.873 
dom Days on market 71.8359 67.49014 0 1010 
onebedroom 1 if house has 1 bedroom 0.003893 0.062272 0 1 
twobedrooms 1 if house has 2 bedrooms 0.100369 0.300494 0 1 
threebedrooms 1 if house has 3 bedrooms 0.57038 0.495026 0 1 
fourbedrooms 1 if house has 4 bedrooms 0.261717 0.439573 0 1 
fivebedrooms 1 if house has 5 bedrooms 0.05307 0.224174 0 1 
sixplusbedrooms 1 if house has 6+bedrooms 0.009925 0.099128 0 1 
onefullbath 1 if house has 1 full bath 0.378381 0.484987 0 1 
twofullbath 1 if house has 2 full baths 0.479274 0.499574 0 1 
threefullbath 1 if house has 3 full baths 0.114018 0.317835 0 1 
fourplusfullbath 1 if house has 4+ full baths 0.027589 0.163793 0 1 
zerohalfbath 1 if house has 0 half baths 0.643807 0.478877 0 1 
onehalfbath 1 if house has 1 half bath 0.334605 0.471856 0 1 
twohalfbath 1 if house has 2 half baths 0.020357 0.141219 0 1 
threehalfbath 1 if house has 3 half baths 0.000939 0.030623 0 1 
fourplushalfbath 1 if house has 4+ half baths 0.000292 0.017096 0 1 
two_fiveyears 2-5 years old at initial listing 0.119357 0.32421 0 1 
six_tenyears 6-10 years old at initial listing 0.118218 0.322869 0 1 
eleven_twentyfiveyears 11-25 years old at initial listing 0.166672 0.372686 0 1 
twentysix-fiftyyears 26-50 years old at initial listing 0.361563 0.480457 0 1 
fiftyone_hundredyears 51-100 years old at initial listing 0.210525 0.407684 0 1 
hundredplusyears 101+ years old at initial listing 0.023665 0.152005 0 1 
centralair 1 if has central air conditioning 0.919403 0.273008 0 1 
basement 1 if has basement 0.618018 0.485876 0 1 
vacant 1 if revealed vacant 0.080274 0.271719 0 1 
sqft1 1 if in 1st SQFT quintile(<=1149) 0.2 0.4 0 1 
sqft2 
1 if in 2nd SQFT quintile(>1150 
& <=1500) 0.2 0.4 0 1 
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Table 4.1 continued 
price sales price ($) 170522.6 129881.2 50000 2880500 
sqft3 
1 if in 3rd SQFT quintile(>1500 
& <= 1900) 0.2 0.4 0 1 
sqft4 
1 if in 4th SQFT quintile(>1900 
& <=2597) 0.2 0.4 0 1 
sqft5 1 if in 5th SQFT quintile(>2597) 0.2 0.4 0 1 
acreage1 1 if acreage <0.25 acres 0.134667 0.34137 0 1 
acreage2 1 if acreage >=0.25, <0.5 0.143002 0.350078 0 1 
acreage3 1 if acreage >=0.5, <1 0.05191 0.221847 0 1 
acreage4 1 if acreage >=1, <5 0.076035 0.265056 0 1 
acreage5 1 if acreage >=5, <20 0.027952 0.164835 0 1 
acreage6 1 if  acreage >20 0.00366 0.06039 0 1 
acreage_unknown 1 if no acreage was reported 0.562775 0.496048 0 1 
relist 1 if listing was "refreshed" 0.09226 0.289395 0 1 
dual 1 if listing agent=selling agent 0.233498 0.423059 0 1 
pool 1 if house has pool 0.045531 0.208467 0 1 
fireplace 1 if house has fireplace 0.300989 0.458692 0 1 
agentowned 
1 if  revealed to be owned by list 
agent 0.009956 0.09928 0 1 
2001 sold in 2001 0.123311 0.328797 0 1 
2002 sold in 2002 0.122604 0.327984 0 1 
2003 sold in 2003 0.142745 0.349815 0 1 
2004 sold in 2004 0.152716 0.359716 0 1 
2005 sold in 2005 0.141037 0.348063 0 1 
2006 sold in 2006 0.162133 0.368575 0 1 
2007 sold in 2007 0.155455 0.36234 0 1 
99xx 
list price ending in 9,900 through 
9,999  0.304 0.46 0 1 
9000 list price ending in 9,000 0.058 0.234 0 1 
49xx 
list price ending in 4,900 through 
4,999 0.728 0.26 0 1 
5000 list price ending in 5,000 0.089 0.285 0 1 
0000 list price ending in 0,000 0.042 0.202 0 1 
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Table 4.2: Unconditional Means 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
    List price-   ANOVA Smaller Reduction     ANOVA JustBelowPrice 
List Price n= sold price Std Dev P-Value 
with  
Just-Below? DOM Std Dev P-Value Sells Quicker? 
79,900-79,999 689 2097.08 4703.163 0.63 No 74.26 62.58 0.77 Yes 
80,000 99 1853.4 4980.06     76.25 75.51     
84,900-84,999 426 1536.97 4498.46 0.3 Yes 66.81 58.72 0.029 Yes** 
85,000 249 1924.32 5063.42     78.34 77.63     
89,900-89,999 944 1728.52 4722.84 0.221 Yes 75.45 60.8 0.42 No 
90,000 111 2338.74 6855.87     70.48 67.4     
94,900-94,999 383 1246.76 5177.49 0.008 Yes*** 69.08 57.79 0.242 No 
95,000 242 2372.03 5120.64     63.64 54.7     
99,900-99,999 884 2293.93 5340.42 0.448 No 69.5 60.26 0.889 No 
100,000 90 1847.12 5999.12     68.57 59.83     
104,900-104,999 453 2536.12 5432.24 0.168 Yes 68.89 60.96 0.278 Yes 
105,000 272 3143.82 6378.65     74.14 66.5     
109,900-109,999 735 2259.39 5038.98 0.025 Yes** 69.61 59.82 0.658 No 
110,000 303 3144.06 7307.51     67.81 59.26     
114,900-114,999 592 2281.83 5749.19 0.295 Yes 67.71 53.75 0.509 Yes 
115,000 324 2707.04 6145.83     69.71 64.32     
119,900-119,999 895 2501.76 5667.57 0.773 No 68.99 61.89 0.814 Yes 
120,000 153 2354.64 6945.68     70.27 64.91     
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Table 4.2 continued 
    List price-   ANOVA Smaller Reduction     ANOVA JustBelowPrice 
List Price n= sold price Std Dev P-Value 
with  
Just-Below? DOM Std Dev P-Value Sells Quicker? 
125,000 348 3154.55 6409.23     67.94 63.3     
129,900-129,999 1046 3191.91 6163.58 0.395 No 71.1 63.45 0.016 No** 
130,000 148 2720.64 7308.35     57.86 56.74     
134,900-134,999 569 3650.94 6353.63 0.836 No 64.37 58.456 0.047 Yes** 
135,000 262 3552.91 6367.41     73.79 73.17     
139,900-139,999 953 3278.01 5890.69 0.034 Yes** 66.97 56.44 0.036 Yes** 
140,000 100 4702.01 10369.48     79.89 82.23     
144,900-144,999 401 3615.1 5936.73 0.988 Yes 65.89 53.06 0.23 No 
145,000 202 3625.86 6128.03     60.18 58.55     
149,900-149,999 811 3479.25 3479.12 0.028 Yes** 69.39 61.62 0.063 Yes* 
150,000 117 4986.74 8048.67     70.92 59.19     
154,900-154,999 374 3516.37 5738.86 0.779 Yes 67.86 59.31 0.547 No 
155,000 189 3680.05 7640.5     64.69 58.52     
159,900-159,999 801 4453.73 6832.44 0.44 No 71.76 61.47 0.87 No 
160,000 64 3762.22 7732.24     70.48 67.25     
164,900-164,999 375 3998.4 6739.08 0.283 Yes 69.69 54.8 0.834 Yes 
165,000 175 4637.16 59.25     70.88 75.88     
169,900-169,999 690 4669.02 8154.99 0.164 Yes 70.57 64.35 0.93 Yes 
170,000 45 6389.02 7849.54     71.4 81.59     
8
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Table 4.2 continued 
    List price-   ANOVA Smaller Reduction     ANOVA JustBelowPrice 
List Price n= sold price Std Dev P-Value 
with  
Just-Below? DOM Std Dev P-Value Sells Quicker? 
174,900-174,999 371 3508.32 5729.43 0.68 Yes 66.32 60.32 0.572 No 
175,000 188 3782.48 7493.33     62.43 59.91     
179,900-179,999 574 5337.36 6941.7 0.011 No** 67.66 59.65 0.075 No* 
180,000 50 2594.92 11050.96     52.2 46.79     
184,900-184,999 245 4934.2 6999.62 0.505 Yes 68.7 65.04 0.705 No 
185,000 136 5447.6 7538     66.11 62.44     
189,900-189,999 522 6204.42 8136.47 0.94 Yes 74.54 70.36 0.73 No 
190,000 39 6269.15 9737.17     70.56 58.32     
194,900-194,999 137 4823.77 5682.16 0.021 Yes** 65.82 52.94 0.755 No 
195,000 118 6776.67 7710.37     63.64 58.45     
199,900-199,999 458 5630.46 8234.08 0.018 Yes** 70.76 58.75 0.303 Yes 
200,000 59 8437.18 11466.4     79.47 77.75     
204,900-204,999 102 5376.14 9088.77 0.598 Yes 57.64 48.9 0.0168 Yes** 
205,000 104 5936.83 5921.99     78.5 72.78     
209,900-209,999 270 6862.34 8252.06 0.205 Yes 76.522 74.35 0.566 No 
210,000 112 8103.45 9825.42     71.71 75.12     
214,900-214,999 198 6379.56 7008.98 0.287 No 66.04 59.42 0.203 Yes 
215,000 135 5434.49 9195.55     74.73 63.29     
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Table 4.2 continued 
    List price-   ANOVA Smaller Reduction     ANOVA JustBelowPrice 
List Price n= sold price Std Dev P-Value 
with  
Just-Below? DOM Std Dev P-Value Sells Quicker? 
219,900-219,999 342 7066.17 8971.44 0.145 Yes 77.49 77.71 0.683 No 
220,000 59 8950.01 10648.5     72.966 82.61     
224,900-224,999 197 7342.66 7612.96 0.612 Yes 74.07 67.3 0.722 Yes 
225,000 162 7838.02 10885.93     76.64 68.76     
229,900-229,999 327 7209.5 7911.08 0.3 Yes 71.97 60.1 0.38 No 
230,000 47 8480.85 7446.46     63.8 57.1     
234,900-234,999 134 7195.43 10598.4 0.728 No 61.48 59.14 0.009 Yes*** 
235,000 74 6663.98 10543.3     88.32 86.07     
239,900-239,999 341 7725.76 9326.69 0.759 Yes 70.6 63.91 0.231 Yes 
240,000 39 8211.8 9803.43     83.56 63.08     
244,900-244,999 97 8094.19 9014.62 0.727 No 76.18 70.34 0.616 Yes 
245,000 75 7650 7200.93     82.49 94.7     
249,900-249,999 348 7973.6 8492.75 0.081 yes* 72.01 70.1 0.325 Yes 
250,000 67 10235.07 14620.4     81.46 80.87     
254,900-254,999 91 6816.7 9077.06 0.552 No 69.41 66.9 0.702 Yes 
255,000 51 5650.31 14300.14     73.55 51.76     
259,900-259,999 265 8163.43 7369.33 0.722 Yes 75.33 77.97 0.655 No 
260,000 24 8716.67 6310.15     67.95 72.49     
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Table 4.2 continued 
    List price-   ANOVA Smaller Reduction     ANOVA JustBelowPrice 
List Price n= sold price Std Dev P-Value 
with  
Just-Below? DOM Std Dev P-Value Sells Quicker? 
264,900-264,999 91 8836.97 11193.13 0.957 Yes 76.25 74.32 0.795 Yes 
265,000 61 8935.48 11506.08     79.49 77.22     
269,900-269,999 216 10283 12416.2 0.543 No 73.72 61.13 0.597 No 
270,000 19 8505.26 6663.37     65.89 70.09     
274,900-274,999 106 7963.27 7750.64 0.139 Yes 58.78 47.23 0.019 Yes** 
275,000 107 10006.2 11952.43     77.03 64.43     
279,900-279,999 182 8987.76 7845.45 0.987 Yes 64.37 54.14 0.192 Yes 
280,000 22 9021.74 9547.1     81 72.71     
284,900-284,999 57 9971.15 12015.54 0.318 Yes 58.21 50.9 0.149 Yes 
285,000 53 12230.31 11949.24     74.92 68.65     
289,900-289,999 163 9507.71 10725.7 0.134 No 64.44 64.46 0.75 No 
290,000 18 5079.89 18790.7     59.44 50.57     
294,900-294,999 23 9971.28 9403.62 0.434 No 56.91 44.34 0.833 Yes 
295,000 62 8278.46 9034.8     59.58 53.74     
299,900-299,999 244 9039.16 10182.35 0.008 Yes*** 73.47 65.42 0.421 Yes 
300,000 30 14340 1115.28     83.67 64.73     
*,**,*** represent the result is significant at the ten percent, five percent, and one percent level respectively 
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Table 4.3: Comparisons of Specific Price Points   
ListPrice n= DOM Std Dev List-Sold Std Dev 
74,900 259 68.73 56.01 2060.55 4917.23 
75,000 199 74.92 72.82 2236.19 5318.37 
79,000 67 57.44 55.06 3025.22 4457.79 
79,900 569 74.14 64.88 2272.76 4838.15 
80,000 99 76.25 75.51 1853.40 4980.06 
 84,900 341 64.63 55.27 1739.27 4572.72 
85,000 249 78.34 77.63 1924.32 5063.42 
89,000 109 72.81 84.07 2177.00 4588.54 
89,900 767 76.17 61.55 1909.37 4853.77 
90,000 111 70.47 67.40 2338.74 6855.84 
 94,900 309 69.15 59.65 1360.99 5204.38 
95,000 242 63.64 54.70 2372.03 5120.64 
99,000 112 72.75 66.99 3141.21 7745.21 
99,900 720 68.58 61.00 2263.66 5293.07 
100,000 90 68.58 59.84 1847.28 5999.19 
 104,900 371 65.92 60.35 2660.48 5428.04 
105,000 272 74.14 66.49 3146.82 6376.48 
109,000 133 72.69 66.09 2465.32 5926.34 
109,900 618 67.95 57.00 2376.47 4723.71 
110,000 303 67.81 59.26 3144.06 7307.51 
 114,900 501 65.29 52.04 2465.89 5946.24 
115,000 324 69.71 64.32 2707.04 6145.83 
119,000 164 67.39 63.78 2627.31 5457.21 
119,900 771 67.72 63.31 2590.42 5677.65 
120,000 153 70.27 64.91 2354.63 6945.68 
 124,900 574 63.13 50.97 2898.66 5470.48 
125,000 348 67.94 63.29 3154.55 6409.22 
129,000 126 78.71 72.86 4120.31 5922.36 
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Table 4.3 Continued   
ListPrice n= DOM Std Dev List-Sold Std Dev 
129,900 890 71.27 63.51 3191.08 6227.85 
130,000 148 57.86 56.74 2720.64 7308.35 
 134,900 483 63.60 52.55 3595.71 6232.34 
135,000 262 73.79 73.17 3552.91 6367.41 
139,000 149 65.63 63.01 4161.93 6204.20 
139,900 817 66.55 56.24 3319.94 5952.24 
140,000 100 79.89 82.23 4702.07 10396.48 
 144,900 456 66.46 55.69 4209.96 6615.23 
145,000 202 60.18 58.55 3625.85 6128.03 
149,000 116 75.52 63.50 5436.12 7603.32 
149,900 707 69.20 62.53 3454.99 6726.05 
150,000 117 70.93 59.19 4986.74 8048.67 
 154,900 327 67.59 60.02 3460.20 5992.71 
155,000 189 64.68 58.52 3680.05 7640.49 
159,000 126 75.17 60.24 4218.21 6370.57 
159,900 714 70.79 61.17 4494.61 6954.81 
160,000 64 70.48 67.24 3762.22 7732.23 
 164,900 329 71.54 55.73 4167.40 7046.68 
165,000 175 70.88 75.88 4637.16 5969.25 
169,000 102 70.79 64.54 5961.99 7533.11 
169,900 621 71.48 65.87 4603.38 8212.33 
170,000 45 71.40 81.59 6389.02 7849.54 
 174,900 315 70.78 63.25 4548.47 7435.02 
175,000 177 72.14 76.42 4869.78 7783.83 
179,000 115 70.11 76.41 5734.30 6051.54 
179,900 509 68.55 61.30 5441.69 6885.52 
180,000 50 52.20 46.80 2594.92 11050.96 
 184,900 215 67.97 64.77 4950.46 7300.40 
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Table 4.3 Continued   
ListPrice n= DOM Std Dev List-Sold Std Dev 
185,000 136 66.11 62.44 5447.62 7538.00 
189,000 103 74.26 68.63 6527.32 8781.61 
189,900 486 74.35 69.76 6253.29 8350.11 
190,000 39 70.56 58.32 6296.15 9737.17 
 194,900 112 68.25 54.47 4760.15 5093.06 
195,000 118 63.64 58.44 6776.66 7710.37 
199,000 95 69.64 69.50 6725.67 9585.54 
199,900 407 71.37 58.87 5588.10 8365.49 
200,000 59 79.47 77.75 8437.18 11466.41 
 204,900 88 59.14 48.85 5196.57 9056.16 
205,000 104 78.50 72.78 5936.82 5921.99 
209,000 93 65.72 55.77 5720.22 11062.33 
209,900 238 73.19 69.42 7118.67 8535.96 
210,000 112 71.71 75.12 8103.45 98.25.41 
 214,900 179 66.21 59.55 6882.65 5941.43 
215,000 135 74.72 63.29 5434.48 9195.55 
219,000 81 66.37 59.75 9225.84 9681.62 
219,900 314 77.29 79.47 7184.96 9169.63 
220,000 59 72.96 82.61 8950.08 10648.52 
 224,900 181 73.05 67.68 7519.42 7849.29 
225,000 162 76.63 68.75 7838.02 10885.90 
229,000 90 65.32 63.24 7569.44 8306.21 
229,900 295 73.24 60.58 7291.81 8113.19 
230,000 47 63.80 57.10 8480.85 7446.46 
 234,900 119 63.22 61.68 7224.64 11029.30 
235,000 74 88.32 86.07 6663.98 10543.30 
239,000 91 78.60 73.65 9271.24 9413.24 
239,900 311 71.04 64.07 7908.65 9370.88 
240,000 39 83.56 63.08 8211.76 9803.43 
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Table 4.3 Continued   
ListPrice n= DOM Std Dev List-Sold Std Dev 
244,900 85 74.40 71.35 7706.96 9216.70 
245,000 75 82.49 94.69 7650.00 7200.93 
249,000 63 71.82 71.86 7416.32 6565.26 
249,900 314 71.50 72.02 8106.87 8622.60 
250,000 67 81.46 80.87 10235.07 14620.38 
 254,900 81 68.01 69.29 6229.63 6496.21 
255,000 51 73.54 51.75 5650.31 14300.14 
259,000 86 86.72 75.74 12431.40 12538.32 
259,900 243 75.32 79.15 8324.05 7560.42 
260,000 24 67.95 72.48 8716.66 6310.15 
 264,900 79 77.86 75.48 8888.97 11844.69 
265,000 61 79.49 77.22 8935.48 11506.08 
269,000 59 77.25 71.33 10923.80 10789.28 
269,900 200 73.69 60.48 10470.83 12696.00 
270,000 19 65.89 70.09 8505.26 6663.37 
 274,900 91 60.49 48.01 7954.89 8032.17 
275,000 107 77.02 64.42 10006.20 11952.43 
279,000 79 74.74 64.09 11207.59 11043.65 
279,900 170 64.72 54.61 8919.30 7965.92 
280,000 22 81.00 72.70 9021.74 9547.11 
 284,900 50 58.86 51.73 8446.07 9941.86 
285,000 53 74.92 68.65 12230.31 11949.24 
289,000 72 88.19 85.15 9381.51 9265.15 
289,900 152 65.88 66.06 9634.21 10943.17 
290,000 18 59.44 50.57 5079.88 18790.72 
 294,900 19 55.00 33.41 9815.00 8941.35 
295,000 62 59.58 53.74 8278.46 9034.79 
299,000 65 91.63 77.35 12398.51 12059.15 
299,900 209 72.36 67.25 9037.41 10742.95 
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Table 4.3 Continued   
ListPrice n= DOM Std Dev List-Sold Std Dev 
300,000 30 83.66 64.72 14340.00 11150.28 
 304,900 13 74.23 74.34 9728.57 4781.32 
305,000 17 66.41 47.57 10205.88 5332.85 
309,000 36 62.69 38.85 9363.05 6756.51 
309,900 69 64.60 55.06 9540.58 8698.71 
310,000 40 74.40 60.67 11828.13 10123.95 
 314,900 43 68.14 56.19 9296.41 7652.65 
315,000 64 68.07 61.86 9543.18 10034.77 
319,000 37 47.02 46.59 10243.24 8080.86 
319,900 99 58.98 44.74 10104.69 8138.16 
320,000 20 63.55 48.95 10287.50 9636.58 
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Table 4.4: OLS Results  
    Coef in the    Coef in the    
Listing Price Range Price Ending LnSalesPrice Reg P-val DOM Reg P-val 
$50,000-$100,000 9,9xx 0.078 0.000 3.456 0.016 
  9000 0.015 0.042 -1.537 0.647 
  4,9xx 0.007 0.132 -3.769 0.072 
  5000 -0.003 0.589 -1.614 0.482 
  0,000 -0.017 0.016 -0.543 0.865 
$100,001-$200,000 9,9xx 0.016 0.000 1.988 0.019 
  9000 0.010 0.002 3.187 0.076 
  4,9xx 0.000 0.991 -0.183 0.870 
  5000 -0.004 0.115 1.020 0.466 
  0,000 -0.016 0.000 -1.004 0.601 
$200,001-$300,000 9,9xx 0.010 0.000 0.376 0.839 
  9000 0.014 0.001 3.966 0.153 
  4,9xx -0.013 0.000 -1.975 0.441 
  5000 -0.002 0.609 2.910 0.274 
  0,000 -0.017 0.001 0.934 0.789 
$300,001-$400,000 9,9xx 0.021 0.000 1.188 0.757 
  9000 0.017 0.002 0.378 0.936 
  4,9xx 0.003 0.687 -3.087 0.567 
  5000 0.007 0.216 0.627 0.892 
  0,000 -0.003 0.659 -9.392 0.114 
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Figure 4.1: List Price Ending Frequencies 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Scatter Plot of Residuals 
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Figure 4.3: Histogram of List Price Around $100,000 
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Figure 4.4: Histogram of List Price Around $150,000 
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Figure 4.5: Histogram of List Price Around $200,000 
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Figure 4.6: Histogram of List Price Around $250,000 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
 The first essay examined the effect of real estate agent characteristics on residen-
tial real estate sales outcomes.  Specifically, level of agent activity, measured by number 
of recently concluded transactions (at intervals ranging from the past thirty to one hun-
dred and eighty days), and number of congruently held homes in a listing agent‟s portfo-
lio were included in housing hedonics, controlling for observable home characteristics.  
Data were drawn from seven years of Multiple Listing Service transactions from a large 
Midwestern city.  Results indicated that agents with more recent activity are able to con-
summate the transactions faster.  Each previous transaction in the last thirty days reduced 
the average time on market by around 0.7 days.  Transactions further in the past (up to 
one hundred and eighty days) where consistently beneficial and this effect tapered off as 
the transaction became more distant.  Home sellers using more active agents did, howev-
er, tend to get lower prices, controlling for observable housing characteristics.  Each addi-
tional transaction in the past thirty days reduced expected sales price by 0.16%, or around 
$280 on a median priced home.  Again, this effect was strongest for the most recent 
transaction and then tapered off for those more in the past.  A further specification con-
centrated on the degree of recent agent activity in specific locations and found specializa-
tion (recent activity) in particular geographic region of the city had a beneficial impact 
(for the seller) on final sales price with no noticeable effect on time on market. 
 Attention was then turned to the residential real estate industry market structure in 
the second essay.  Given the seemingly rigid commission structure, as wells anecdotal 
evidence of high market concentration in local markets offered by the Department of Jus-
tice, it would seem to be helpful to know about the general competitiveness of the local 
real estate markets.  Few studies address this issue directly.  An aggregator website, real-
tor.com, was used to collect data on listings throughout one hundred diverse U.S. mar-
kets.  Measures of market concentration, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and 
concentration ratios, were constructed.  While there were a few instances of fairly high 
market concentration (such as Des Moines, IA with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
over 3,000), overall, the concentration levels were not particularly excessive (averaging 
around 1,000).  An examination into the factors that influenced concentration was con-
ducted and there was some evidence that market size has as impact, with the smaller 
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markets being more highly concentrated.  This was particularly pronounced in very small 
markets, giving rise to the possibility that there is a non-zero minimum efficient scale in 
the production process.  Closer examination, however, revealed that across all sizes of 
markets, many very small firms existed (with either one or two listings) meaning any as-
sertions about a non-zero minimum efficient scale must be made with caution. 
 The third essay examined the effect of “just-below” pricing on home sales out-
comes.  While just-below pricing has been studied extensively in the marketing literature, 
and often found to be effective at increasing demand, proposed theories as to how it 
works (which mostly center around consumers misperceiving the price)  would seem to 
lose effectiveness in the context of a very large and highly scrutinized transaction.  The 
same data from the first essay (seven years of Multiple Listing Service transactions) were 
used to construct housing hedonics with variables indicating just-below prices, as well as 
observable housing characteristics.  Results generally indicated a one to two percent price 
premium with houses priced directly below a $10,000 increment.  Furthermore, houses 
under $300,000 priced right on a $10,000 increment were associated with a further 1.6 to 
1.7 penalty.  Just-below pricing had no noticeable impact on time on market.  A direct 
comparison of homes priced both right on and right below various focal points was gen-
erally consistent with the above results. 
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